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This thesis presents steps towards simplifying the implementation of robust
high performance distributed services.
First, we investigate consensus algorithms in the context of fault tolerant sys-
tems. Consensus algorithms, often a critical part of fault tolerant systems, are
notoriously difficult to implement. We present a skeleton consensus algorithm
that can be instantiated into several well-known consensus protocols, provid-
ing insight into the structure of consensus algorithms as well as the differences
and performance tradeoffs between different algorithms. We investigate one-
step Byzantine agreement algorithms which exploit contention-free situations
to provide low latency performance. We present definitions of one-step algo-
rithms and prove a lower bound on the number of processors required for such
algorithms, thereby showing that our algorithm is optimal. We then generalize
our investigation to k-set agreement.
Second, we present RPC chains, a communication primitive that improves
the performance of geodistributed enterprise applications. Distributed enter-
prise applications are often built as a composition of more basic services. Cur-
rently, such compositions are built using remote procedure calls (RPCs). This
results in a rigid and inefficient communication pattern. RPC chains is a new
abstraction that applies two well-known ideas, function shipping and continua-
tions, to allow an improvement in the latency performance and reduction in the
overall bandwidth usage of such geodistributed systems.
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Distributed systems have never been more ubiquitous. Many of the services
that people depend on on a daily basis, ranging from email and various web
services to the stock exchange and even critical services such as air traffic control
are based on distributed systems. As a result, much of systems research over the
last decade has focused on distributed systems, with a particular emphasis on
large scale systems that live in the datacenter. Yet despite all the advancements
in distributed systems technology, building robust distributed systems remain
one of the most daunting tasks that a software engineer can be faced with.
Broadly speaking, the work in this dissertation aims at providing tools that
make it easier to build robust, high performance distributed systems. First,
we present research in consensus protocols aimed at simplifying the building
of high performance fault tolerant systems; second, we present RPC chains, a
communication primitive that improves the communication pattern of geodis-
tributed applications, enabling better performance and lower bandwidth usage.
Overall, our main contributions are as follows:
• a skeleton consensus algorithm that can be instantiated into several well-
known consensus protocols, demonstrating that they require not one, but
two separate quorum systems;
• definitions, lower bounds, and an optimal algorithm for one-step Byzantine
agreement, which optimizes performance in contention-free situations;
• a generalization of one-step algorithms to k-set agreement;
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• RPC chains, a communication primitive that applies concepts of function
shipping and continuations to improve the performance of geographically
distributed enterprise applications.
1.1 Fault Tolerance Made Easy
Computers will fail, and for many systems it is imperative that such failures be
tolerated. State machine replication is a general approach for providing fault
tolerance [64]. Roughly speaking, systems can be engineered to tolerate fail-
ures by having multiple replicas and using a protocol to keep the replicas in
sync. When a failure affects one or more of the replicas, the other replicas can
be depended upon to provide availability. While this approach seems simple in
theory, in practice, building a fault tolerance system can be very challenging. In
particular, consensus protocols, which are used to keep replicas synchronized,
are notoriously difficult to understand and to implement [18, 40]. It is thus de-
sirable to avoid having to re-implement consensus unless absolutely necessary.
One way to avoid having developers implement consensus from scratch ev-
ery time a fault tolerant system is built is to encapsulate the functionality of
consensus into a toolkit, and provide developers with a simple abstraction that
can be used to build the mission critical parts of their application. Examples of
such an approach are Chubby [14] and ZooKeeper [1]. While such systems do
simplify the task of building a fault tolerant system, they are still less than ideal.
They force developers to use a rigid abstraction (often that of a file system) that
may or may not be suitable for the particular application. More often than not,
developers are still required re-engineer their applications from scratch with
2
fault tolerance in mind, albeit avoiding the task of implementing consensus.
We believe that a simpler approach is possible. Given recent advances in
virtual machine and compiler technology, it is not difficult to imagine a straight
forward implementation of the state machine replication approach in the form
of an automatic replication/fault tolerance platform. In such a system, the de-
veloper simply builds a standalone application and runs it on the replication
platform. The replication platform would be responsible for running multiple
copies of the application on a cluster of machines, and keep those replicas in
sync using an appropriate consensus protocol. When a machine fails, the plat-
formwould simply start a new copy of the application on another machine, and
transfer the appropriate state from one or more of the remaining healthy repli-
cas. This would fully automate the implementation of fault tolerance; from the
point of view of the application developer, building a fault tolerant application
would then be no different than building a standalone application.
However, the above description ignores performance considerations. Much
of the performance bottleneck of such a system would stem from the consensus
protocol that is used. Since the original agreement or consensus problemwas pro-
posed in [61], many versions of the problem and corresponding solutions have
been introduced (see [8] for a survey of just the first decade, containing well
over 100 references). Different protocols have different performance character-
istics under different kinds of workloads; selecting the right protocol is key to
providing good performance for an automatic fault tolerance platform.
In Chapter 2, we look at different consensus protocols and propose a skele-
ton algorithm that highlights the commonalities and differences betweens sev-
eral well-known consensus protocols and provide insight into how different
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protocols perform under different circumstances [67]. In Chapter 3, we pro-
pose One-Step Byzantine agreement protocols that are optimized for workloads
where contention is the exception rather than the rule [66]. Finally, in Chapter 4,
we generalize this result for k-Set Agreement [21].
1.2 Improving The Performance Of Geodistributed Applica-
tions
Enterprise applications in datacenters are often a composition of many under-
lying services. Oftentimes, these services are not just distributed within a single
data center but can instead be spread over multiple data centers. As these ap-
plications get more sophisticated, the communication pattern between underly-
ing components that make up a distributed application becomes critical to the
overall performance of the system. This results in a performance bottleneck be-
cause RPCs, which is the communication primitive most often used to connect
these components, leads naturally to a communication pattern that is less than
ideal. In Chapter 5, we propose a simple but powerful communication primi-
tive, RPC Chains [65], that applies two well-known ideas, function shipping and
continuations, to the context of geodistributed enterprise applications to allow an
improvement in the latency performance and a reduction in overall bandwidth
usage. In addition, we propose ways to provide developers with the tools to
debug and isolate problems using RPC chains, and evaluate our design using
two sample applications.
4
1.3 Related Work and Background
1.3.1 Consensus and Fault Tolerance
There is a considerable body of work on the understanding and unification of
consensus protocols. In [56], Mostefaoui and Raynal present a generic quorum
based consensus protocol that works with any failure detector in the class S
or the class S. Guerraoui and Raynal [30] point out similarities between dif-
ferent consensus protocols. They provide a generic framework for consensus
algorithms and show that differences between the various algorithms can be
factored out into a function called Lambda. Each consensus algorithm employs
rather different implementations of Lambda. Later, Guerraoui and Raynal [31]
show that leader-based algorithms can be factored into an Omega module and
an Alphamodule, where all differences are captured by differences in Omega.
In [36], Hurfin et al. present a unifying approach for instantiating a large
class of failure detector-based algorithms that use either a S or S failure detec-
tor, andwhose message pattern in each round vary fromO(n) toO(n2). In Hurfin
el al.’s algorithm, the role of theDeciders is similar to the role of deciders we will
present in this thesis, and the Agreement Keepers play a role similar to that of
the registrars. However, Hurfin et al.’s framework is restricted to leader-based
algorithms and does not have an explicit selector-equivalent.
Zielinski [78] presents a framework for expressing various consensus pro-
tocols using an abstraction called Optimistically Terminating Consensus(OTC).
In [79], Zielinski uses the OTC framework to automatically discover and verify
consensus protocols. Like the algorithms in [30, 31, 36], the class of algorithms
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that can be instantiated with the OTC framework include only failure detector-
based algorithms, and in particular, cannot be used to instantiate randomized
algorithms such as the Ben-Or algorithm.
In [52], Milosevic et al. proposes an abstraction called weak interactive con-
sistency that unifies Byzantine consensus algorithms with and without signed
messages. This allows concise expressions of algorithms such as PBFT [16] and
FaB Paxos [50].
Li et al. [46] propose the Paxos register which unifies Paxos-style consen-
sus protocols. They use the Paxos register to demonstrate the similarities and
differences between Paxos [42], PBFT [16], and FaB Paxos [50].
Guerraoui et al. [29] proposed an abstraction called abstract that allows BFT
protocols to be described as a composition of abstracts, each of which is an
abortable state machine. This provides modularity in the implementation of
BFT protocols and significantly reduces implementation efforts.
Many techniques have been proposed to improve the performance and
reduce the overhead of providing Byzantine fault tolerance. Abd-El-Malek
et al. [2] proposed the optimistic use of quorums rather than agreement proto-
cols to obtain higher throughput. However, in the face of contention, optimistic
quorum systems perform poorly. HQ combines the use of quorums and con-
sensus techniques to provide high performance during normal operation and
minimize overhead during periods of contention [22]. Probabilistic techniques
have also been proposed to reduce the overhead of using quorum systems to
provide Byzantine fault-tolerance [51, 48]. Hendricks et al. [34] proposed the
use of erasure coding to minimize the overhead of a Byzantine fault-tolerant
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storage system. Zyzzyva uses optimistic speculation to decrease the latency ob-
served by clients [41].
Lamport [44] presents lower bounds for the number of message delays
and the number of processors needed for several kinds of asynchronous
non-Byzantine consensus algorithm in; in particular, Fast Learning algorithms
are one-step algorithms for non-Byzantine settings. A one-step version of
Paxos [42], Fast Paxos, is presented in [11, 45]. Fast Paxos tolerates only crash
failures, although [45] alludes to the possibility of a Byzantine fault-tolerant ver-
sion of Fast Paxos.
Brasileiro et al. [13] proposed a general technique for converting any crash-
tolerant consensus algorithm into a crash-tolerant consensus algorithm that ter-
minates in one communication step if all correct processors have the same initial
value. Bosco, presented in Chapter 3 is an extension of the ideas presented in
that work to handle Byzantine failures. The key difference between handling
crashed failures and Byzantine failures is that when Byzantine failures need to
be tolerated, equivocation must be handled correctly.
A simple and elegant crash-tolerant consensus algorithm of the same flavor,
One-Third-Rule, appears in [19]. This work has been extended to handle Byzan-
tine faults by considering transmission faults where messages can be corrupted
in addition to being dropped [10]. The algorithms in [19, 10] differ from the
algorithms we present in this thesis because they use a different failure model,
where failures are attributed to message transmissions, rather than to proces-
sors.
Friedman et al. [27] proposed a weakly one-step algorithm that tolerates
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Byzantine faults and terminates with probability 1 but does not tolerate a strong
network adversary. In particular, their protocol is dependent on a common coin
oracle and assumes that the network adversary has no access to this common
coin; a strong network adversary with access to the common coin can prevent
termination.
Among the algorithms constructed in [78] are two Byzantine consensus al-
gorithms with one-step characteristics that require n > 5t and n > 3t. The first
of these algorithms is a weakly one-step algorithm that requires partial syn-
chrony; the second algorithm, while appearing to violate the lower bounds we
will show in Chapter 3, is neither weakly nor strongly one-step because pro-
cessors can only decide in the first communication step when, in addition to the
system being failure-free and contention-free, all processors are fast enough that
the timeout mechanism in the algorithm is not triggered.
1.3.2 Function Shipping and Continuations
RPC chains utilize two well-understood ideas in the context of remote execu-
tion: function shipping and continuations.
Function shipping is the general technique of sending computation to the
data rather than bringing the data to the computation. It is used in some sys-
tems where the cost of moving data is large compared to the cost of moving
computation. For example, Diamond [37] is a storage architecture in which ap-
plications download searchlet code to disk to perform efficient filtering of large
data sets locally, thereby improving efficiency. RPC chains use function ship-
ping to send chaining logic.
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A continuation [69] refers to the shifting of program control and transfer of
current state from one part of a program to another. Extending this to distributed
continuations is a natural step, allowing a continuation to shift program control
from one processor to another. Several works in the parallel programming com-
munity give high-level programming continuation constructs and specify their
behavior formally, e.g., [53, 38]. Distributed continuations were exploited to
enhance the functionality of web servers and overcome the stateless nature of
HTTP interaction. By comparison, the RPC chain is a generic mechanism that is
independent of the service provided by servers. RPC chains support complex
chaining structures, and can be used with a diverse set of servers.
The above mentioned ideas for code mobility, and others, are leveraged in
a variety of high-level programming paradigms for distributed execution. Dis-
tributed workflows, e.g., [7, 75], can use distributed continuations to distribute
a workflow description in a decentralized fashion.
MapReduce [23], and Dryad [76] are programming models for data-parallel
jobs, such as a data mining calculations, which process large amounts of data
in batches. These systems target self-contained jobs that execute for substantial
periods, while RPC Chains are intended for short-lived remote executions in an
environment with many diverse services that are possibly developed indepen-
dently of their applications.
Mobile agents have been extensively studied in the literature and many sys-
tems have been built, including Telescript/Odyssey [72], Aglets [6], D’Agents
[28], and others (see e.g., [73, 32]). A mobile agent is a process that can au-
tonomously migrate itself from host to host as it executes; migration involves
moving the process’s current state to the new host and resuming execution. The
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motivation for mobile agents include (a) bringing processes closer to the re-
sources they need in a given stage of the computation, and (b) allowing clients
to disconnect from the network while an agent executes on their behalf. An RPC
Chain can be considered as a mobile agent whose purpose is to execute a series
of RPC calls. However, mobile agents are much more general and ambitious
than RPC Chains (which possibly contributed to their eventual demise): they
have social abilities, being able to adjust their behavior according to the host
in which they are currently executing; they can learn about execution environ-
ments never envisioned by their creators; and they can persist if the clients that
created them disappear. Much of the literature regarding mobile agents is about
security (how agents can survive malicious hosts, and how hosts can protect
themselves against malicious agents) and language support for code mobility
(how to write programs that can transparently move to other machines). For
RPC chains, security is a smaller concern in the trusted data center and enter-
prise environments that we consider, and we are not concerned about transpar-
ent mobility.
Some related work includes more targeted uses of mobile code. Work on
Active Networks introduced network packets called capsules, which carry code
that network switches execute to route the packet (see [70] for a survey). This
provides a general scheme for extending network protocols beyond the exist-
ing deployed base, and allows for more dynamic routing schemes. In contrast,
RPC chains are aimed at higher-level applications, and their main purpose is
to eliminate communication hops when a client needs to call many services in
succession.
Distributed Hash Tables (e.g., Chord [68], CAN [62], Pastry [63],
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Tapestry [77]) have a lookup protocol, for finding the host responsible for a given
key. Such protocols generally need to contact several hosts successively, and this
can be done in two ways. In an interactive lookup protocol, the host that initiates
the lookup operation issues RPC’s to each host in succession. A recursive lookup
protocol [26] works like a routing protocol: the host that initiates the operation
contacts the first host in the sequence, which in turn contacts the next one, and
so forth; when a host finds the key, it contacts the request initiator directly. This
protocol is hard-coded into the lookup operation, and it is executed by a set of
servers that implement this operation. In contrast, RPC chains provide a generic
chaining mechanism that is independent of the operation (service function) ex-
ecuted.
Finally, SOAP [74] is a protocol that supports RPC’s using XML over HTTP. It
has the notion of intermediaries that can process a SOAP message (RPC) before
it reaches the final recipient. However, there is no client logic that routes and
transform messages, and the notion of a pre-specified distinguished final recip-
ient is inherent to SOAP. Typical uses for intermediary nodes include blocking
messages (firewall), buffering and batching of messages, tracing, and encrypt-
ing/decrypting messages as it passes through an untrusted domain.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF CONSENSUS
Consensus protocols are a critical component in the construction of fault tol-
erant systems. In this chapter, we look at consensus protocols for Internet-like
systems in which there are no real-time bounds on execution ormessage latency.
Such systems are often termed asynchronous. While published asynchronous
consensus protocols may at first appear complex and quite different from each
other, we claim that all these protocols are derived from the same simple genes.
Our contributions are the following:
• We present the genes of consensus algorithms in the form of a skeleton
algorithm that can be configured to produce various consensus protocols.
The skeleton algorithm gives insight into how consensus protocols work,
and we learn that consensus requires not one but two separate quorum
systems;
• We demonstrate how this approach can be used to instantiate three well-
known consensus protocols: Paxos [42], Chandra-Toueg [17], and Ben-
Or [9];
• We implement our approach and present a performance comparison of
these protocols under varyingworkload and crash failures. We learn inter-
esting trade-offs between various design choices in consensus algorithms.
12
2.1 The Consensus Problem
In prior work, there has been neither agreement nor consensus on terminology.
We propose nomenclature for talking about the consensus problem and proto-
cols to solve it (see Table 2.1).
In the consensus problem there is a set of proposers, each of which can pro-
pose a proposal, and a set of deciders, each of which decides one of the proposals.
The goal is to ensure each non-faulty decider decides the same proposal, even
in the face of faulty proposers.
We must specify the execution and failure model of processors (computers
that run programs) and links (network connections between processors). Pro-
cessors run actors, which are either proposers or deciders. A processor may run
both a proposer and a decider—in practice, the proposer often would like to
learn the outcome of the agreement.
Processors are either honest, executing programs faithfully, or Byzantine [43],
exhibiting arbitrary behavior. We will also use the terms correct and faulty, but
not as alternatives to honest and Byzantine. A correct processor is an honest
processor that always eventually makes progress. A faulty processor is a Byzan-
tine processor or an honest processor that has crashed or will eventually crash.
Note that honest and Byzantine are mutually exclusive, as are correct and faulty.
However, a processor can be both honest and faulty.
We assume that each pair of processors is connected by a link, which is a
bi-directional reliable virtual circuit that ensures messages sent on this link are
delivered, eventually, and in the order in which they were sent (i.e., an honest
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sender keeps retransmitting a message until it receives an acknowledgment or
crashes). Also, the receiver can tell who sent a message (e.g., using MACs), so
a Byzantine processor cannot forge a message so it appears like a message sent
by an honest processor.
Because our system is asynchronous, we do not assume timing bounds on
execution of programs or on latency of communication. We also do not assume
that a processor on one side of a link can determinewhether the processor on the
other side of the link is correct or faulty. Timeouts cannot reliably detect faulty
processors in an asynchronous system, even if only crash failures are allowed.
Why is consensus hard? Consider the following strawman protocol: each de-
cider collects proposals from all proposers, determines the minimum proposal
from among the proposals it receives (in case it received multiple proposals),
and decides on that one. If there were no faulty processors at all, such a proto-
col would work, albeit limited in speed by the slowest processor or link.
Unfortunately, even if only crash failures are possible, deciders do not know
how long to wait for proposers. If deciders were to use time-outs, they might
time-out on different proposers, and these deciders would decide different pro-
posals as a result. Thus each decider has no choice but to wait until it has re-
ceived a proposal from all proposers. If one of the proposers is faulty, such a
decider will never decide.
In an asynchronous system with crash failures (Byzantine failures comprise
crash failures), there exists no deterministic protocol in which all correct de-
ciders eventually decide [25] (a result called FLP after the people that showed
this impossibility, Fisher, Lynch, and Patterson). We can circumvent this limi-
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tation by not requiring that all correct deciders eventually decide. Instead, we
will require only that the consensus protocol cannot reach a state in which some
correct decider can never decide. The strawman protocol of deciding the mini-
mum proposal can reach a state in which deciders wait indefinitely for a faulty
proposer, and is, therefore, not a consensus protocol, even with our weaker re-
quirement.
A protocol that solves the consensus problem must have the following three
properties:
Definition: Agreement: If two honest deciders decide, they decide the same
proposal.
Definition: Validity: If all honest proposers propose the same proposal v, then
an honest decider that decides will decide v.
Definition: Non-Blocking: Given any run of the protocol that reaches a state in
which a particular correct decider has not yet decided, there exists a continua-
tion of the run in which that decider does decide on a proposal.
To abstract the interaction that takes place in agreement algorithms we de-
scribe a mechanism through which messages are exchanged. The mechanism is
based on the notion of quorum systems, which we now review and extend.
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term description aka
actor proposer, decider, selector, or registrar
Byzantine potentially exhibits arbitrary behavior
correct honest and makes progress eventually
crashed halted execution indefinitely
decider actor who wants to decide
faulty Byzantine or stops making progress
guarded set contains at least one honest participant
honest not Byzantine (but may crash)
instance phase in protocol
(network) link connects two participants
processor hardware on which actor runs
participant member of a quorum system
proposal initial value submitted to protocol
proposer actor whose role is to propose a value
quorum (set) any two quorums of participants intersect
quorum system structure on set of actors
registrar actor that prevents multiple decisions
selector actor that suggests decisions
suggestion proposal + instance identifier
max-wait set maximal set of participants one can wait for
Table 2.1: Terminology.
2.2 Extended Quorum Systems
Before we introduce our skeleton algorithm, we introduce a useful building
block. An extended quorum system is a quadruple (P,M,Q,G). P is a set of pro-
cessors called the participants. M,Q, and G are each a collection of subsets of
participants (that is, each is a subset of 2P). M is the collection of maximal-wait
sets, Q the collection of quorum sets, and G the collection of guarded sets. Each is
defined below.
A subset of P is a guarded set if and only if it is guaranteed to contain at
least one honest participant. Note that a guarded set may consist of a single
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participant that may be crashed but is not Byzantine. As an example, consider
an (n, t)-threshold quorum system, a system with n participants, of which at most t
are faulty. In the case of crash failures only, the guarded sets are all non-empty
subsets of P. In the Byzantine case, guarded sets have to be of size larger than t
in order to guarantee that they contain at least one honest participant.
When requesting information from all participants, crashed or Byzantine
participants may never respond. An actor often tries to collect as many re-
sponses to a broadcast request as possible, but has to stop collecting additional
responses when it is in danger of waiting indefinitely.M characterizes this—it is
a set of subsets of P, none contained in another, such that some M ∈ M contains
all the correct processors.1 In a threshold quorum system, the maximal-wait sets
are all subsets of n − t participants, where n is the number of processors and t is
the maximum number of failures.
Quorums are sets of processors that satisfy Consistency:
Definition: Consistency: An extended quorum system satisfies Consistency if
and only if the intersection of any two quorums (including a quorumwith itself)
is guaranteed to contain an honest participant. (In other words, the intersection
of two quorums is a guarded set.)
To illustrate, consider how consistency can be satisfied in an (n, t)-threshold
system. With only crash failures possible, consistency requires that quorums
be larger than n/2 participants, because two strict majorities always intersect,
and no participants are Byzantine. When Byzantine failures are possible, con-
1For those familiar with Byzantine Quorum Systems [47],M is the set of complements of the




guarded set (in G) > 0 > t
quorum set (in Q) > n/2 > (n + t)/2
maximal-wait set (inM) = n − t = n − t
set of participants (P) > 2t > 5t
Table 2.2: Size requirements for Threshold Quorum Systems that satisfy
consistency and opaqueness.
sistency requires having quorums be larger than size (n + t)/2. To see why this
works, consider any two quorums. Without removing duplicates, the sets to-
gether have more than n + t elements. But there are only n participants, so the
intersection must contain more than t participants, and thus contains at least
one honest participant.
Definition: Availability: An extended quorum system satisfies Availability if
and only if every maximal-wait set contains a quorum.
Because Availability requires that every maximal-wait set contains a quo-
rum, we get n − t > n/2, or n > 2t, putting a lower bound on n. We obtain that
n − t > (n + t)/2, or n > 3t.
Availability requires that quorums can have no more than n − t elements,
otherwise there would exist maximal-wait sets that do not contain a quorum.
In this chapter, we will also require that extended quorum systems satisfy
Opaqueness [47]:2
Definition: Opaqueness: An extended quorum system satisfies Opaqueness if
2Opaqueness is a stronger property than Availability typically required of quorum systems,
as Availability only requires that each maximal-wait set contain a quorum, possibly including
Byzantine members.
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and only if each maximal-wait set contains a quorum consisting entirely of hon-
est participants.
We illustrate what this requirement means for (n, t)-threshold quorum sys-
tems. In a crash failure model, opaqueness requires that every maximal-wait
set contains a quorum, so we get that n − t > n/2, or n > 2t, placing a lower
bound on n. In the Byzantine model, t of the participants in a maximal-wait
set may be Byzantine. Thus we have to require that n − 2t > (n + t)/2, which
simplifies to n > 5t. Table 2.2 summarizes requirements for P,M, Q, and G in
(n, t)-threshold systems.
The simplest example of quorum systems are threshold quorum systems,
but other quorum systems may be more appropriate for particular applications.
See [59] and [47] for advantages and disadvantages of various quorum systems
for crash and arbitrary failure models respectively.
One degenerate extended quorum system, used in some well-known con-
sensus protocols, is a leader extended quorum system: There is one participant
(the leader), and that participant by itself forms the only maximal-wait set in
M, quorum in Q, and guarded set in G. Because quorum sets have to satisfy
consistency, the leader has to be honest.
2.3 The Consensus Skeleton
In Section 2.1, we presented a strawman consensus protocol that, in the presence
of faulty processors, may reach a state where deciders can never decide. To















Figure 2.1: The actions of the various actors.
an execution of a protocol that, once started, runs in isolation. Instances have
also been called rounds, phases, or ballots.
In order to guarantee consistency among decisions of deciders in the pres-
ence of multiple instances, we introduce two new types of actors in addition to
proposers and deciders, namely registrars and selectors.3 A proposer sends its
proposal to the selectors. Selectors and registrars exchange messages and occa-
sionally registrars inform deciders about potential values for decision. Deciders
apply some filter to reach a decision.
The actions of the various actors are summarized in Figure 2.1. Broadly
speaking, the objective of selectors is to reach a decision within an instance,
while the objective of registrars is to maintain a collective memory that ensures
that decisions are maintained across instances, preventing conflicting decisions.
3As stated before, a processor may run multiple actors, although each can run at most one
registrar and at most one selector.
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2.3.1 Instances
An instance decides a proposal if an honest decider decides a proposal in that
instance. All honest deciders that decide in an instance must be guaranteed to
decide the same proposal, so an instance cannot decide multiple proposals. It
is not guaranteed that an instance decides any proposal. By having multiple
instances, if one instance does not decide, then future ones may decide. It is
important to guarantee that if multiple instances decide, they decide the same
proposal.
Instances are identified by instance identifiers r from a totally ordered set
that we will call N¯ (can be, but does not have to be, N). Instance identifiers
induce an ordering on instances, and we say that one instance is before or after
another instance, but keep in mind that instances may execute concurrently.
We name proposals v,w, .... Within an instance, proposals are paired with
instance identifiers. We call a pair (r, v) a suggestion, where v is the proposal and
r an instance identifier. A special suggestion ⊥ is used to indicate absence of a
specific proposal.
Selectors select proposals, and registrars register suggestions. Each registrar
keeps careful track of the last suggestion that it has registered. The initial regis-
tered suggestion of a registrar is ⊥.
A new instance starts with the registrars sending their current registered
suggestions to the selectors. (Exactly how an instance starts depends on the
complete design of the consensus protocol, and will be addressed later.) Each
selector determines if one of the suggestions it receives could have been decided
in a previous instance. If so, it selects the corresponding proposal (of which
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there can be at most one). If not, it selects one of the proposals issued by the
proposers. The selector creates a suggestion from the selected proposal using
the current instance identifier, and sends the suggestion to the registrars.
If a registrar receives the same suggestion from a quorum of selectors (that
is, all selectors in the quorum sent the same instance identifier and proposal), it
(i) registers the suggestion, and (ii) broadcasts the suggestion to the deciders. If
a decider receives the same suggestion from a quorum of registrars, the decider
decides the corresponding proposal in those suggestions.
2.3.2 Guarded Proposal
Selectors have to be careful not to select proposals that could conflict with prior
decisions. Before selecting a proposal in an instance, a selector obtains a set
of suggestions L from each participant in a maximal-wait set of registrars. A
proposal v is a potential-proposal if L contains suggestions containing v from a
guarded set. This means that at least one honest registrar sent a suggestion
containing v. The selector computes the guarded proposal of L, if any, as follows:
1. Consider each potential-proposal v separately:
(a) Consider all subsets of suggestions containing v from guarded sets
of registrars. The minimum instance identifier in a subset is called a
guarded-instance-identifier;
(b) The maximum among the guarded-instance-identifiers for v is called
the associated-instance-identifier of v. (Note that because v is a potential-
proposal, there has to be at least one guarded-instance-identifier and
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thus the maximum is well-defined.) The support-sets for v are those
subsets of suggestions for which the guarded-instance-identifier is
the associated-instance-identifier;
2. Among the potential-proposals, select all proposals with the maximal
associated-instance-identifier. If there is exactly one such potential-
proposal v′, and v′ , ⊥, then this is the guarded proposal. Otherwise
there is no guarded proposal.
For example, consider a Byzantine threshold quorum system Q with t = 2
and n = 11. Thus, a quorum has to have more than (n + t)/2 elements, which is
7 or more in our case, and a maximal-wait set has to contain at least n − t = 9
elements. A guarded set has at least t + 1 = 3 elements. Now consider the
following suggestions in the maximal-wait set: 4 suggestions with the value
(3,green), 2 suggestions with the value (5,green), and 3 suggestions with the
value (4,red). Both green and red are potential-proposals. The maximum in-
stance identifier among sets of 3 suggestions for green is 3, as there are only 2
suggestions with instance identifier 5. The maximum instance identifier among
sets of 3 suggestions for red (there is only one such set) is 4, thus 4 is the max-
imum associated-instance-identifier. Because red is the only proposal with an
associated-instance-identifier of 4, red is the guarded proposal even though
there are twice as many suggestions supporting green!
For benign systems, the guarded proposal in an (n, t)-threshold quorum sys-
tem is simply the proposal corresponding to the maximum instance identifier
in L. For Byzantine systems, divide the suggestions in L by proposal, and sort
each subset by instance identifier. Consider the proposal with the highest t + 1st
instance identifier. If there is exactly one of these, this is the guarded proposal.
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Note that in protocols in which instances are invoked one after the other
completes, sequentially, associated-instance-identifierwill always be the identifier
of the previous instance.
If a decider obtains suggestions (r, v) from a quorum of registrars (and con-
sequently decides), then any honest selectors in instances ≥ r are guaranteed
to compute a guarded proposal v′ such that v′ = v (unless they crash). If a se-
lector fails to compute a guarded proposal in a particular instance then this is
both evidence that no prior instance can have decided and a guarantee that no
prior instance will ever decide. However, the reverse is not true. If a selector
computes a guarded proposal v′, it is not guaranteed that v′ is or will be decided.
2.3.3 Extended Quorum System API
Participants of an extended quorum system send and receive messages of the
form 〈message-type, instance, source, suggestion〉. The source indicates the sending
processor.
An extended quorum system E = (P,M,Q,G) has the following interface:
- E.broadcast(m): send a message m to all participants in P;
- E.wait(pattern): wait for messages, matching the given pattern (specifies,
for example, the message type and instance number). When the sources
of the collected messages form an element or a superset of an element of
M, then return the set of collected messages;
- E.uni-quorum(set of messages): if the set of messages contains the same
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suggestion from a quorum, then return that suggestion.4 Otherwise, re-
turn ⊥;
- E.guarded-proposal(set of messages): return the guarded proposal among
these messages, or ⊥ if there is none.
2.3.4 State Maintenance
Each selector and registrar is associatedwith an instance, which is the instance it
is currently sending messages in, and receiving messages from. A registrar can
change the instance with which it is associated, progressing to a later instance
after aborting the current one. A selector can also progress to later instances,
but unlike a registrar it is allowed to keep participating in older instances.
The instance protocol uses not one but two extended quorum systems:
1. Registrars form an extended quorum system R that is the same for all in-
stances. R has to satisfy consistency and opaqueness. Selectors use R to
find the guarded proposal, if any, to select proposals that do not conflict
with earlier decisions.
2. Selectors form an extended quorum system Sr, which may be different for
each instance r. Each Sr has to satisfy both consistency and opaqueness
as well. Registrars in instance r use quorums of Sr to avoid having two
registrars register different suggestions within the same instance.
Deciders, although technically not part of an instance, do try to obtain the
same suggestion from a quorum of registrars in each instance. We associate de-
4By the consistency property, there can be at most one such suggestion.
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ciders with instances for simplicity of presentation. Also for convenience, we
will have deciders form an extended quorum system D. However, deciders
never send messages, and thus we will only use D to send messages to all de-
ciders.
Each selector imaintains a set Pi containing proposals it received (across in-
stances). A selector waits for at least one proposal before participating in the rest
of the protocol, so Pi is never empty during execution of the protocol. (Typically,
Pi first contains a proposal from the proposer on the same processor as selector
i.) For simplicity we assume an honest proposer sends a single proposal. The
details of how Pi is formed and used are different for different agreement pro-
tocols, so this will be discussed when the full protocols are presented. Pi has
an operation Pi.pick(r) that returns either a single proposal from the set or some
value as a function of r. Different protocols use different approaches for select-
ing that value, and these will also be discussed later.
Registrars are assumed to have state that survives crashes and recoveries. In
particular, a registrar j running on an honest processor maintains:
r j: current instance identifier;
c j: last registered suggestion, initially ⊥ .
Both increase monotonically over time.
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2.3.5 The Instance Mechanism
A protocol execution is a collection of instance executions. Figure 2.2 shows the
mechanism that enables the execution of an individual instance. We call this the
instance mechanism. A protocol execution starts when the first instance execution
starts. How instances are invoked is different for different protocols, and some
ways are described in Section 2.4. The extended quorum systems used in the
instance protocol determines the potential participants in each instance and is
also protocol specific. Potential participants execute in an instance once pre-
conditions for their actions are satisfied.
Lemma 1. In the mechanism in Figure 2.2,
(a) if any honest registrar i computes a suggestion qri , ⊥ in Step (R.2) of instance
r, then any honest registrar that computes a non-⊥ suggestion in that step of that
instance, computes the same suggestion.
(b) if any honest decider k computes a suggestion drk , ⊥ in Step (D.2) of instance
r, then any honest decider that computes a non-⊥ suggestion in that step of that
instance, computes the same suggestion.
Proof. Case (a): in the set of suggestions contained in Mri collected in Step (R.1)
Sr.uni-quorum must have identified a unanimous suggestion qri , ⊥ from a
quorum of selectors Qri . Consider another honest registrar j that completes
Step (R.2) of instance r, computing a unanimous suggestion qrj for q
r
j , ⊥ from
a quorum Qrj. By the consistency property on Sr, Qri
⋂
Qrj contains an honest
selector. An honest selector always sends the same suggestion to all registrars,




At the start of instance r, each registrar i executes:
(R.0) send ci to all participants (selectors) in Sr:
Sr.broadcast(〈select, r, i, ci〉)
Each selector j in Sr executes:
(S.1) wait for selectmessages from registrars:
Lrj := R.wait(〈select, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(S.2) see if there is a guarded proposal:
vrj := R.guarded-proposal(Lrj);
(S.3) if not, select from received proposals instead:
if vrj = ⊥ then vrj := P j.pick(r) fi;
(S.4) send a suggestion to all registrars:
R.broadcast(〈register, r, j, (r, vrj)〉);
Each registrar i (still in instance r) executes:
(R.1) wait for registermessages from selectors:
Mri := Sr.wait(〈register, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(R.2) see if there is a unanimous suggestion from a quorum:
qri := Sr.uni-quorum(Mri );
(R.3) register the suggestion:
ci := if qri = ⊥ then (r,⊥) else qri fi;
(R.4) send the suggestion to all deciders:
D.broadcast(〈decide, r, i, ci〉)
Each decider k executes:
(D.1) wait for decidemessages from registrars:
Nrk := R.wait(〈decide, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(D.2) see if there is a unanimous suggestion from a quorum:
drk := R.uni-quorum(Nrk);
(D.3) if there is, and not ⊥, decide:
if ( drk = (r, v
′) and v′ , ⊥ ) then decide v′ fi;
Figure 2.2: An instance of the consensus protocol.
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The case for the deciders (b) is similar although it is based on the consis-
tency property on R, since the deciders require a unanimous suggestion from a
quorum of registrars in instance r before deciding. 
Note that Step (S.2) does not have the property of Lemma 1 because selectors
do not try to obtain a unanimous suggestion from a quorum.
Corollary 2. In the mechanism in Figure 2.2, if any honest registrar registers a sug-
gestion (r, v) with v , ⊥ in Step (R.3) of instance r, then any honest registrar that
registers a suggestion with non-⊥ proposal in that step of that instance, registers the
same suggestion.
Proof. By Lemma 1 all honest registrars, unless they crash, compute the same
suggestion or ⊥ in (R.2). Those that computed a non-⊥ suggestion therefore
register the same suggestion in (R.3), and send that same non-⊥ suggestion in
(R.4) of that instance. 
Lemma 3. In the mechanism in Figure 2.2, if any honest registrar sends a suggestion
(r¯, v) with v , ⊥ in Step (R.0) of instance r (r is not the initial instance), then any
honest registrar that sends a suggestion (r¯, v′) with v′ , ⊥ in that step of that instance,
sends the same proposal, i.e., v = v′.
Proof. By Corollary 2 all honest registrars that register a suggestion in instance r¯
based on the same non-⊥ proposal register the same suggestion in (R.3). There-
fore, if their suggestions sent in (R.0) of instance r were registered with a non-⊥
suggestion in (R.3) of the same instance r¯, they send the same suggestions. 
Lemma 4. In the mechanism in Figure 2.2,
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(a) if each honest selector that completes Step (S.4) of instance r sends the same sug-
gestion, then any honest registrar that completes Step (R.2) of that instance com-
putes the same suggestion;
(b) if each honest registrar that completes Step (R.4) of instance r sends the same
suggestion, then any honest decider that completes Step (D.2) of that instance
computes the same suggestion;
(c) if each honest registrar that completes Step (R.0) of instance r sends the same
suggestion, then any honest selector that completes Step (S.2) of that instance
computes the same proposal.
Proof. Case (a): assume the conditions of the lemma with respect to each hon-
est selector completing Step (S.4) of instance r. Each registrar that completes
Step (R.1) collects suggestions from a maximal-wait set of selectors. By defini-
tion, each quorum contains at least one honest selector. Therefore, the set Mri
of instance r of any honest registrar i cannot contain a unanimous suggestion
for a suggestion different from what all the honest selectors have broadcast in
Step (S.4). Opaqueness requires that every maximal-wait set contains a quorum
of honest participants, therefore, every honest registrar that completes Step (R.2)
of instance r will end up having a unanimous suggestion from a quorum of se-
lectors, and will compute the same suggestion.
Case (b) is similar to the first case, and follows because each honest decider
will eventually receive decidemessages for the same suggestion sent by a quo-
rum of honest registrars in Step (R.4).
We now prove case (c) in which each honest registrar that completes
Step (R.0) sends the same registered suggestion. Notice that each set of sug-
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gestions Lri contains at least the suggestions from a guarded set of honest regis-
trars, and cannot contain suggestions from a guarded set of Byzantine registrars.
Since each honest registrar sends the same suggestion, no honest selector will
find a unanimous suggestion from a guarded set of registrars for any proposal
contained in the suggestion of the honest registrars. Each selector will have a
unanimous suggestion sent by a guarded set of honest registrars, and therefore
will end up computing the same proposal at the end of Step (S.2). 
And nowwe address the last andmost important propertywe need to prove:
Lemma 5. The mechanism in Figure 2.2 satisfies that if r′ is the earliest instance in
which a proposal w is decided by some honest decider, then for any instance r, r > r′, if
an honest registrar registers a suggestion in Step (R.3), it is (r,w).
Proof. Since all instances are taken from a fully ordered set, any subset of them
are fully ordered. The proof will be by induction on all the instances, past in-
stance r′, in which eventually some honest registrar registers a suggestion.
Let w , ⊥ be the proposal decided by an honest decider in Step (D.2) of
instance r′. Let Qr′ ∈ R be the quorum in instance r′ whose suggestions caused
the decider to decide w.
Let r1 > r′ be the first instance past r′ at which some honest registrar eventu-
ally completes Step (R.3). Since this registrar completes Step (R.3), it must have
received register messages from a maximal-wait set of selectors following
Step (R.1) of instance r1. Each honest selector that sent such a message received
select messages from a maximal-wait set of registrars that were sent in their
Step (R.0) of instance r1. Each honest registrar that completes Step (R.0) did not
register any new suggestion in any instance r′′, r′ < r′′ < r1, because r1 is the first
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such instance. Moreover, the registrar will not register such a suggestion in the
future, since it aborted all such instances r′′ before sending its selectmessage
in Step (R.0) of instance r1.
In Step (R.0) a registrar sends the last suggestion it had registered. Some
registrars may send suggestions they had registered prior to instance r′ while
some other registrars send suggestions they registered in Step (R.4) of instance
r′.
Each honest selector j awaits a set of messages L j from a maximal-wait set in
Step (S.1). L j has to contain suggestions from a quorum Qr1 consisting entirely of
honest registrars (by the opaqueness property ofR). By the consistency property
of R the intersection of Qr1 and Qr′ has to contain a guarded set, and thus Qr1 has
to contain suggestions from a guarded set of honest registrars that registered
(r′,w). There cannot be such a set of suggestions for a later instance, prior to r1.
By Corollary 2 and Lemma 3, there cannot be any suggestions from a guarded
set for a different proposal in instance r′. Thus, each honest selector will select
a non-⊥ proposal and those proposals are identical.
By Lemma 4, every honest registrar that completes Step (R.4) will register
the same suggestion, thus the proof holds for r1.
Now assume that the claim holds for all instances r′′, r′ < r′′ < r, and we will
prove it for instance r.
There is an honest registrar that completes Step (R.3) in instance r and reg-
isters (r,w). Following Step (R.1) of instance r it must have received register
messages from a maximal-wait set of selectors. Each honest selector that sent
such a message received select messages from a maximal-wait set of regis-
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trars that were sent in Step (R.0) of instance r.
Each honest registrar sends the last suggestion it had registered. Some hon-
est registrars may send suggestions they had registered prior to instance r′while
some other honest registrars send suggestions they registered in Step (R.4) of
instance r′′, r′ ≤ r′′ < r. By the induction hypothesis, all honest registrars that
send a suggestion that was registered past instance r′ use the proposal w in their
suggestion.
In instance r, each honest selector j awaits a set of messages L j from a
maximal-wait set in Step (S.1). L j has to contain suggestions from a quorum
Qr consisting entirely of honest registrars (by the opaqueness property of R).
By the consistency property of R the intersection of Qr and Qr′ has to contain a
guarded set, and thus Qr has to contain suggestions from a guarded set of hon-
est registrars that registered (r′,w) in instance r′, and may have registered (r′′,w)
in some later instance. Therefore, selector j obtains w as a possible potential-
proposal. Since all honest registrars that register a suggestion past instance r′
register the same proposal, there is a support-set for wwith associated-instance-
identifier r¯ ≥ r′.
There cannot be any other possible potential-proposal with an associated-
instance-identifier later than r′, since, by induction, no honest registrar registers
a suggestion with a different proposal later than r′. Therefore, each honest se-
lector will select the proposal w. By Lemma 4, every honest registrar that will
complete Step (R.4) will register the same suggestion, thus the proof holds for r.

We now formulate and prove the main theorem about instances:
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Theorem 6 (Agreement). If two honest deciders decide, they decide the same proposal.
Proof. If the deciders decide in the same instance, the result follows from
Lemma 1. Say one decider decides v′ in instance r′, and another decider de-
cides v in instance r, with r′ < r. By Lemma 5, all honest registrars that register
in instance r register (r, v′). By the consistency property of R, an honest decider
can only decide (r, v′) in instance r, and thus v = v′. 
2.4 Full Protocols
The description of instances above does not specify how instances are created,
how broadcasts are done in steps (R.0), (S.4), and (R.4), what specific extended
quorum systems to use for R and Sr, how a selector j obtains proposals for P j, or
how j selects a proposal from P j. We now show how Paxos [42], the algorithm
by Chandra and Toueg [17], and the early protocol by Michael Ben-Or [9] make
these choices. They use the instance protocol as a subroutine.
2.4.1 Paxos
Paxos [42] was originally designed only for honest systems. In Paxos, any pro-
cessor can create an instance r at any time, and it becomes the leader of that
instance. The choice of leader is governed by a weak leader election protocol
(see [42]) that is outside the scope of this chapter. The leader creates a unique
instance identifier r from its processor identifier and a sequence number per
processor that is incremented for each new instance created on that processor.
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The leader runs both a proposer and a selector. Sr is a leader extended quorum
system consisting only of the selector at the leader.
The leader starts the instance by broadcasting a prepare message contain-
ing the instance identifier to all registrars. (This broadcast is not part of the in-
stance protocol of Figure 2.2.) Upon receipt, a registrar i first checks that r > ri,
and, if so, sets ri to r and proceeds with Step (R.0). Note that since there is only
one participant in Sr, the broadcast in (R.0) is actually a point-to-point message
back to the leader, now acting as selector. In Step (S.3), if the leader has to pick
a proposal from P j, it selects the proposal by the local proposer, thus there is no
need for proposers to send their proposals to all selectors.
Validity follows directly from the absence of Byzantine participants. To see
why Paxos isNon-Blocking, consider a state in which some correct decider has
not yet decided. Now consider the following continuation of the run: one of
the correct processors creates a new instance with an instance identifier higher
than used before. Because there are always correct processors and there is an
infinite number of instance identifiers, this is always possible. The processor
sends a prepare message to all registrars. All honest registrars start in Step (R.0)
of the instance on receipt, so the selector at the leader will receive sufficient
select messages in Step (S.1) to continue. Due to Lemma 4, and the fact that
there is only one selector in Sr, all honest registrars register the same suggestion
in Step (R.3). The deciders will each receive a unanimous suggestion from a
quorum of registrars in Step (D.1) and decide in Step (D.3).
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2.4.2 Chandra-Toueg
The Chandra-Toueg algorithm is another consensus protocol that is designed
for honest systems [17]. The Chandra-Toueg algorithm requires a coordinator
in each instance. The role of the coordinator is similar to the leader in Paxos.
However, unlike Paxos, Chandra-Toueg does not use a leader election proto-
col. Instead, the coordinator of each instance is defined by a simple mod of
the instance number by the number of processors in the system, i.e., the role of
the coordinator rotates from processor to processor at the end of each instance.
Each processor in the system is both a proposer and a registrar. For each in-
stance r, the selector quorum Sr is the extended quorum consisting only of the
coordinator of that instance.
To start the protocol, a proposer sends a proposal message to all processors.
Upon receiving the first proposal, a registrar starts in instance 0 and executes
(R.0). The coordinator of each instance starts (S.0) upon receiving a select
message for that instance. In (S.3), Pi.pick(r)will simply return the first proposal
that was received by the coordinator. Registrars that successfully complete (R.1-
4) move to the next instance.
Note that when registrars are waiting for a registermessage from the se-
lector of a particular instance, they are not guaranteed to receive a reply because
the coordinator of that instance can fail. Registrars thus have to be prepared to
timeout. When this happens, the registrars starts executing (R.0) in the next in-
stance, which would have a different coordinator. When a registrar receives a
registermessage with a larger instance number than the one it is currently in,
it aborts the current instance and skips forward to the instance of the register
message.
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In the original description of the Chandra-Toueg algorithm, the coordinator
for an instance is also the decider for that instance. This means that in order for
all processors to become aware of a decision, the coordinator has to broadcast
an announcement. We can modify the Chandra-Toueg algorithm such that all
processors are deciders in all instances without affecting the rest of the proto-
col. The effect of this change is the elimination of one round of communication
while increasing the number of messages that are sent in (R.4) of the instance
mechanism. This is similar to the algorithm proposed in [57]. A comparison of
the original Chandra-Toueg algorithm and this modified version was done in
[71].
As in the case of Paxos, Validity follows directly from the absence of Byzan-
tine participants. TheNon-blocking property follows from that fact that a hon-
est, correct selector can always receive sufficient select messages in (S.1) to
continue. All honest registrars will always receive the same suggestion in (R.3)
since there is only one selector in each instance. If the coordinator for an instance
fails, registrars for that instance will timeout and move to the next instance.
2.4.3 Ben-Or
In this early protocol [9], each processor runs a proposer, a selector, a registrar,
and a decider. Instances are numbered 1, 2, .... Proposals are either 0 or 1 (that
is, this is a binary consensus protocol), and each Pi = {0, 1}. Pi.pick(r) selects
the local proposer’s proposal for the first instance, or a random one in later
instances.
Each of the selectors, registrars, and deciders starts in instance 1 and runs a
37
loop. A selector j runs a loop consisting of steps (S.1) through (S.4), increment-
ing r j right after Step (S.4). A registrar i runs a loop consisting of steps (R.0)
through (R.4), incrementing ri after Step (R.4). Note that the broadcasts in steps
(R.0) and (R.4) are to the same destination processors and happen in consecu-
tive steps, so they can be merged into a single broadcast, resulting in just two
broadcasts per instance. Finally, a decider k runs a loop consisting of steps (D.1)
through (D.3), incrementing rk after Step (D.3).
Sr is the same asR for every instance r; both consist of all processors and uses
a threshold quorum system. Ben-Orworks equally well in honest and Byzantine
environments as long as opaqueness is satisfied. It can be easily shown that if a
decider decides, all other deciders decide either in the same or the next instance.
This suggests an easy termination rule.
Validity follows from the rule that selectors select the locally proposed pro-
posal in the first instance: If all selectors select the same proposal v, by Lemma 4
the registrars register v, and, by the opaqueness property of R, the deciders de-
cide v. The Non-Blocking property follows from the rule that honest selectors
pick their proposals at random in all but the first instance, and so it is always
possible that they pick the same proposal, after which decision in Step (D.3) is
guaranteed because of the opaqueness property of R.
2.5 Implementation and Protocol Comparisons
The description of the Paxos, Chandra-Toueg, and Ben-Or protocols in the pre-
vious section show that while these protocols were originally presented as dif-
ferent from one another, they share a common skeleton. Using the instance
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mechanism presented in Section 2.3.5, each of these protocols can be instanti-
ated by using protocol-specific ways of i) defining the selector quorums in each
instance, ii) starting instances, and iii) implementing Pi.pick(r) in (S.3).
Having observed the similarities between the three protocols, we now in-
vestigate the effect of their differences on their performance. To do this, we im-
plemented the instance mechanism defined earlier, and built each of the three
protocols on top of it.
In this section, we present the implementation of these protocols and results
from our simulations.
2.5.1 Implementation
We built a replicated state machine out of the consensus protocols that provides
a simple logging service to remote clients. The service consists of a set of servers
that run a consensus protocol. Clients can submit values to any server, which
will then attempt to get that value decided in an epoch. To decide a value, a
server submits that value as a proposal associated with the current epoch. When
a value is decided in an epoch, the client that submitted the value is informed
of the epoch number that the value was decided in, and all servers move to
the next epoch. Each server maintains an internal queue of values that it has
received from clients and attempts to get them decided in a FIFO fashion.
For the implementation of Paxos, there is an important design decision that
was not described in the original protocol [42]. Paxos requires a leader election
mechanism that is integral to the performance of the protocol. In our imple-
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mentation, we support two different leader election mechanisms. First, we built
a version of Paxos where each processor that wants to propose a value simply
makes itself the leader. By having each processor pick instance numbers for in-
stances where it is the leader from a disjoint set of instance numbers, we ensure
that each instance can only have one unique leader. We call this version of Paxos
GreedyPaxos.
We also built a second variant of Paxos which uses a token passing mech-
anism to determine the leader. We call this version of Paxos TokenPaxos. Each
processor i maintains state of who the current leader is in a local variable Li.
Initially, Li is set to null. Upon receiving a valid preparemessage from another
processor, i.e., a prepare message for the current epoch and with an instance
number larger than any that has previously been received, the processor sets
the sender of the prepare message as the leader. To propose a value, a processor
sends the proposal to the current leader. If the current leader is not known, it
makes itself the leader and starts an instance. Each select message is tagged
by the sending registrar with a token request if that processor has pending re-
quests in its queue and would like to receive the token in a subsequent epoch.
Each processor that sees a register message updates a local bitmap to keep track
of the list of processors which are requesting the token. When the current leader
commits all its local requests, it sends the token to a random processor that is
requesting the token. In order to recover from lost tokens from a crashed leader,
each processor sets the value of Li to null if it does not receive any messages
from the current leader for a certain amount of time.
For the implementation of Chandra-Toueg, we modify the original algo-
rithm such that all processors are deciders in all instances. As described in Sec-
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tion 2.4.2, this avoids requiring deciders to broadcast a decision when a value is
decided. This improves the performance of our particular application where all
servers need to learn about decisions.
All our implementations used a simple threshold quorum system for selec-
tor, registrar, and decider quorums.
2.5.2 Experimental Setup
In all our experiments, the logging service consists of a set of 10 servers. The
workload is sent to the servers via a set of 10 clients. Each client sends requests
to the servers at a rate that is described by a poisson distribution with a mean of
λc requests per minute. Client’s choice of server to send a request to is decided
randomly. All messages between client to server and server to server have a
latency that is given by a lognormal distribution with a mean of 100 ms and
a standard deviation of 20 ms. For each set of experiments, we measure the
duration between the time that a server first receives a value from a client to the
time that the server learns that the value has been decided.
2.5.3 Results
In the first set of experiments, we ran the server against clients with varying
loads until 100 values have been decided by the logging service. We vary the
request rate from each client, λc, from 0.5 requests per minute to 14 requests per
minute. We report on the mean and median values of 100 decisions averaged

























Figure 2.3: Mean time to decide a single value under varying request rates
bars makes the data difficult to read.)
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the mean and the median time it takes for
a single value to be decided. The graphs show that as load increases, the time
it takes for a value to be decided increases gradually. At low loads, the per-
formance of all four algorithms is about equivalent. This is because in all four
algorithms, in the ideal case, it takes four rounds of communication for a value
to be decided. This means that in the best case, it takes on average 400 ms for
value to be decided.
As load in increased, performance degrades because there is contention be-
























Figure 2.4: Median time to decide a single value under varying request
rates
Note that GreedyPaxos performs consistently better than TokenPaxos, par-
ticularly under heavy load. This is because GreedyPaxos does not need to wait
for the token before proposing a value. Under heavy load, each GreedyPaxos
processor sends a prepare message in the beginning of each epoch without
having to wait. The processor with the largest instance number wins and gets
its value decided. TokenPaxos, on the other hand, will always decide values of
the processor with the token before passing the token to the next processor with
requests. This has 2 implications: i) if the leader keeps getting new requests,
other processors can starve, and ii) one round of communication is wasted in



























Figure 2.5: Communication overhead under varying request rates
Figure 2.5 shows the number of messages that each protocol uses to commit
100 values under different request rates. We note that Ben-Or incurs a much
larger overhead than the other protocols. This is because Ben-Or uses a selec-
tor quorum that consists of all processors rather than just a leader/coordinator.
This means that (R.0) and (S.4) of the instance mechanisms send n2 messages in
each instance, rather than just nmessages in Paxos and Chandra-Toueg.
We also observe that compared to TokenPaxos, GreedyPaxos sends more
messages as load increases. Under heavy load, each GreedyPaxos processor
will broadcast a prepare message to all other processors in the beginning of
every round. This results in n2 messages being sent rather than the n prepare


























































Figure 2.8: Communication overhead under varying failure rates
In order to investigate the performance of each protocol under crash fail-
ure, we injected failures into our simulations. We modeled the arrival of failure
events as a poisson distribution with a rate of λ f failures per minute. When a
failure event occurs, we fail a random server until the end of the epoch. To en-
sure that the system is able to make progress, we limit the number of failures in
an epoch to be less than half the number of servers in the system. Keeping the
request rate from clients steady at 7 requests per minute per client, we vary the
failure rate from 0.5 failures per minute to 12 failures per minute.
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 show mean and the median decision latency,
respectively, for the the four protocols under varying failure rates. Note
that GreedyPaxos and Ben-Or are not affected significantly by server failures.
Chandra-Toueg and TokenPaxos, on the other hand, see significant performance
degradation as the failure rate increases. This is because Chandra-Toueg and To-
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kenPaxos are both dependent on timeout to recover from failures of particular
processors. In the case of Chandra-Toueg, the failure of the coordinator requires
that all registrars timeout and move to the next instance. In the case of Token-
Paxos, if the processor that is holding the token crashes, a timeout is required to
generate a new token.
A comparison study presented by Hayabashibara et al. found that Paxos
outperforms Chandra-Toueg [33] under crash failures. We find that this result
depends on the leader election protocol used by Paxos. In our experiments,
GreedyPaxos outperforms Chandra-Toueg, but TokenPaxos performsworse un-
der certain failure scenarios.
Figure 2.8 shows the message overhead of each protocol under varying fail-




BOSCO: ONE-STEP BYZANTINE ASYNCHRONOUS CONSENSUS
In the previous chapter, we presented a skeleton algorithm that demon-
strated the commonalities between several well-known consensus algorithms.
In this chapter, we examine consensus algorithms for a particular setting,
Byzantine asynchronous systems, where faulty processors can behave in an ar-
bitrary manner and there are no assumptions about the relative speed of pro-
cessors nor about the timely delivery of messages. We present novel algorithms
that can deliver one-step performance under these assumptions.
Previous results have shown that algorithms that solve asynchronous Byzan-
tine consensus must have correct executions that require at least two commu-
nication steps even in the absence of faults [39], where a single communication
step is defined as a period of time where each processor can i) send messages;
ii) receive messages; and iii) do local computations, in that order. However,
this does not mean that such algorithms must always take two or more com-
munication steps. We show that when there is no contention, it is possible for
processors to decide a value in one communication step.
One-step decisions can improve performance for applications where con-
tention is rare. Consider a replicated state machine: if a client broadcasts its
operation to all machines, and there is no contention with other clients, then all
correct machines propose the same operation and can respond to the client im-
mediately. Thus an operation completes in just two message latencies, the same
as for a Remote Procedure Call to an unreplicated service.
Previously, such one-step algorithms have been proposed for crash failure as-
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sumptions [13, 11, 19, 44, 45, 24]. In this chapter, we will show that they are also
possible for Byzantine asynchronous consensus in the presence of a strong net-
work adversary. Overall, we present the following contributions in this chapter:
• we provide two definitions of one-step asynchronous Byzantine consen-
sus algorithms that provide low latency performance in favorable condi-
tions while guaranteeing strong consistency when failures and contention
occur;
• we prove lower bounds in the number of processors required for such
algorithms;
• and we present Bosco, the first one-step algorithm for Byzantine consen-
sus that meets these bounds.
3.1 The Byzantine Consensus Problem
The Byzantine consensus problem was first posed in [43], albeit for a syn-
chronous environment. In this chapter we focus on an asynchronous environ-
ment.
In this problem, there is a set of n processors P = {p, q, ...} each of which have
an initial value, 0 or 1. An unknown subset T of P contains faulty processors.
These faulty processors may exhibit arbitrary (aka Byzantine) behavior, andmay
colludemaliciously. Processors in P−T are correct and behave according to some
protocol. Processors communicate with each other by sending messages via a
network. The network is assumed to be fully asynchronous but reliable, that is,
messages may be arbitrarily delayed but between two correct processors, will
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be eventually be delivered. Links between processors are private so a Byzantine
processor cannot forge a message from a correct processor.
In addition, we assume a strong network adversary. By this, we mean that the
network is controlled by an adversary that, with full knowledge of the contents
of messages, may choose to arbitrarily delay messages as long as between any
two correct processes, messages are eventually delivered.
The goal of a Byzantine consensus protocol is to allow all correct processors
to eventually decide some value. Specifically, a protocol that solves Byzantine
consensus must satisfy:
Definition: Agreement: If two correct processors decide, then they decide the
same value. Also, if a correct processor decides more than once, it decides the
same value each time.
Definition: Unanimity: If all correct processors have the same initial value v,
then a correct processor that decides must decide v.
Definition: Validity: If a correct processor decides v, then vwas the initial value
of some processor.
Definition: Termination: All correct processors must eventually decide.
Note that algorithms that satisfy all of the above requirements are not pos-
sible in asynchronous environments when even a single crash failure must be
tolerated [25]. In practice, algorithms circumvent this limitation by assuming
some limitation in the extent of asynchrony in the system, or by relaxing the
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Termination property to a probabilistic one where all correct processors termi-
nate with probability 1.
Unanimity requires that the outcome be predetermined when the initial val-
ues of all correct processors are unanimous. A one-step algorithm takes advan-
tage of such favorable initial conditions to allow correct processors to decide in
one communication step.
We define two notions of one-step protocols:
Definition: Strongly one-step: If all correct processors have the same initial
value v, a strongly one-step Byzantine consensus algorithm allows all correct pro-
cessors to decide v in one communication step.
Definition: Weakly one-step: If there are no Byzantine processors in the sys-
tem and all processors have the same initial value v, a weakly one-step Byzantine
consensus algorithm allows all correct processors to decide v in one communi-
cation step.
While both can decide in one step, strongly one-step algorithmsmakes fewer
assumptions about the required conditions and in particular cannot be slowed
down by Byzantine failures when all correct processors have the same initial
value. Strongly one-step algorithms optimize for the case where some proces-
sors may be faulty, but there is no contention among correct processors, and




We show that a Byzantine consensus algorithm that tolerates t Byzantine failures
among n processors requires n > 7t to be strongly one-step and n > 5t to be
weakly one-step.1 These results are for the best case scenario in which each
correct processor broadcasts its initial value to all other processors in the first
communication step and thus they hold for any algorithm.
3.2.1 Lower Bound for Strongly One-Step Byzantine Consen-
sus
Lemma 7. A strongly one-step Byzantine consensus algorithm must allow a correct
processor to decide v after receiving the same initial value v from n − 2t processors.
Proof. Assume otherwise, that there exists a run in which a strongly one-step
Byzantine algorithm A does not allow a correct processor p to decide v after
receiving the same initial value v from n − 2t processors. Since A is a strongly
one-step algorithm, the fact that processor p does not decide after the first round
implies that some correct processor q has an initial value v′, v′ , v. Now con-
sider a second run, in which all correct processors do have the same initial value
v. Without blocking, p can wait for messages from at most n − t processors.
Among these, t can be Byzantine and send arbitrary initial values. This means
that processor p is only guaranteed to receive n − 2t messages indicating that
n − 2t processors have the initial value v. Given thatA is a strongly one-step al-
1These results are for threshold quorum systems, but may be generalized to use arbitrary
quorum systems.
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gorithm, pmust decide v at this point. However, from the point of view of p, this
second run is indistinguishable from the first run. This is a contradiction. 
Theorem 8. Any strongly one-step Byzantine consensus protocol that tolerates t fail-
ures requires at least 7t + 1 processors.
Proof. Assume that there exists a strongly one-step Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm A that tolerates up to t Byzantine faults and requires only 7t processors.
We divide the processors into three groups: G0 and G1 each contain 3t proces-
sors, of which the correct processors have initial values 0 and 1 respectively; G∗
contain the remaining t processors.
Now consider the following configurations C0 and C1. In C0, t of the proces-
sors in G1 are Byzantine, and processors in G∗ have the initial value 0. Assume
that Byzantine processors act as if they are correct processors with initial value
0 when communicating with processors in G∗, and initial value 1 when com-
municating with processors not in G∗. Now consider that a correct processor
p0 ∈ G∗ collects messages from n − t processors in the first communication step.
Given that the network adversary controls the order of message delivery, p0 can
be made to receive messages from all processors in G0 and G∗, and the t Byzan-
tine processors in G1. p0 thus receives n − 2t messages indicating that the n − 2t
senders have initial value 0. By Lemma 7, p0 must decide 0 after that first com-
munication step. In order to satisfy Agreement,Amust ensure that any correct
processor that ever decides in C0 decides 0. We say that C0 is 0-valent.
In C1, t of the processors in G0 are Byzantine, and processors in G∗ have
the initial value 1. In addition, Byzantine processors act as if they are correct
processors with initial value 1 when communicating with processors from G∗
and initial value 0 when communicating with processors not in G∗. A correct
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processor p1 ∈ G∗ collects messages from n − t in the first communication step.
Suppose that the network adversary chooses to deliver messages from G1 and
G∗, as well as from the t Byzantine processors. Now p1 collects n − 2t messages
indicating that n − 2t senders have initial value 1. By Lemma 7, p1 must decide
1 after the first communication step. In order to satisfy Agreement, A must
ensure that any correct processor that ever decides in C1 decides 1. We say that
C1 is 1-valent.
Further assume that for both configurations, messages from any processor
in G∗ to any processor not in G∗ are arbitrarily delayed such that in any asyn-
chronous round, when a processor that is not in G∗ awaits n − t messages, it
receives messages from every processor that is not in G∗. Now, any correct pro-
cess q0 < G∗ executing A in C0 will be communicating with 3t processors that
behave as if they are correct processors with initial value 0 and 3t processors that
behave as if they are correct processors with initial value 1. As we have shown
above, C0 is a 0-valent configuration, so A must ensure that q0 decides 0, if it
ever decides. Similarly, a correct processor q1 < G∗ executingA in C1 will also be
communicating with 3t processors that behave as if they are correct processors
with initial value 0 and 3t processors that behave as if they are correct proces-
sors with initial value 1. However, since we have shown that C1 is a 1-valent
configuration, A must ensure that q1 decides 1, even though it sees exactly the
same inputs as q0. This is a contradiction. 
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3.2.2 Lower Bound for Weakly One-Step Byzantine Consensus
We now show the corresponding lower bound for weakly one-step algorithms.
The lower bound for weakly one-step algorithms happens to be identical to
that for two-step algorithms. The bound for two-step algorithms was shown
in [49]. We show a corresponding bound for weakly one-step algorithm for
completeness, but note that this is not a new result.
We weaken the requirement on Lemma 7 as follows:
Lemma 9. A weakly one-step Byzantine consensus algorithm must allow a processor
to decide v after learning that n − t processors have the same initial value v.
Proof. A processor can only wait for messages from n − t processors without
risking having to wait indefinitely. Since a weakly one-step Byzantine consen-
sus algorithm must decide in one communication step if all correct processors
have the same initial value and there are no Byzantine processors, it must decide
if all of the n − t messages claim the same initial value. 
Theorem 10. A weakly one-step Byzantine consensus protocol that tolerates t failures
requires at least 5t + 1 processors.
Proof. We provide only a sketch of the proof since it is similar to that of Theo-
rem 8. Proof by contradiction. Assume that a Byzantine consensus algorithmA
is weakly one-step and requires only 5t processors. We divide the 5t processors
into three groups,G0,G1, andG∗, containing 2t, 2t, and t processors respectively.
All correct processors in G0 have the initial value 0 and all correct processors in
G1 have the initial value 1.
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As in the proof of Theorem 8, we construct two configurations C0 and C1. In
C0, processors inG∗ have the initial value 0 and t processors inG1 are Byzantine.
Correspondingly, in C1, processors inG∗ have the initial value 1 and t processors
in G0 are Byzantine. These Byzantine processors behave as they do in the proof
of Theorem 8. It is thus possible for processors in G∗ to decide 0 and 1 in C0
and C1 respectively. Therefore, correct processors in G0 and G1 must not decide
any value other than 0 and 1 respectively. However, if all messages from any
processor in G∗ to any processor not in G∗ are delayed, then correct processors
in C0 and C1 see exactly the same inputs. This is a contradiction. 
3.3 Bosco
We now present Bosco (Byzantine One-Step COnsensus), an algorithm that
meets the bounds presented in the previous section. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Bosco is the first strongly one-step algorithm that solves asynchronous
Byzantine consensus with optimal resilience. The idea behind Bosco is simple,
and resembles the one presented in [13]. We simply extend the results of [13] to
handle Byzantine failures. The Bosco algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Bosco is an asynchronous Byzantine consensus algorithm that satisfies
Agreement, Unanimity, Validity, and Termination. Bosco requires n > 3t, where
n is the number of processors in the system, and t is the maximum number of
Byzantine failures that can be tolerated, in order to provide these correctness
properties. In addition, Bosco is weakly one-step when n > 5t and strongly
one-step when n > 7t.
The main idea behind Bosco is that if all processors have the same initial
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Algorithm 1: Bosco: a one-step asynchronous Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm
Input: vp
broadcast 〈VOTE, vp〉 to all processors1
wait until n − t VOTEmessages have been received2
if more than n+3t2 VOTE messages contain the same value v then3
DECIDE(v)4
if more than n−t2 VOTE messages contain the same value v,5
and there is only one such value v then6
vp ← v7
Underlying-Consensus(vp)8
value, then given enough processors in the system, a correct processor is able
to observe sufficient information to safely decide in the first communication
round. Additional mechanisms ensure that if such an early decision ever hap-
pens, all correct processors must either i) early decide the same value; or ii) set
their local estimates to the value that has been decided.
When the algorithm starts, each processor p receives an input value vp, that
is the value that the processor is trying to get decided and the value that it
will use for its local estimate. Each processor broadcasts this initial value in a
VOTE message, and then waits for VOTE messages from n − t processors (likely
including itself). Since at most t processors can fail, votes from n − t processors
will eventually be delivered to each correct processor.
Among the votes that are collected, each processor checks two thresholds:
if more than n+3t2 of the votes are for some value v, then a processor decides
v; if more than n−t2 of the votes are for some value v, then a processor sets its
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local estimate to v. Each processor then invokes Underlying-Consensus, a
protocol that solves asynchronous Byzantine consensus (satisfies Agreement,
Unanimity, Validity, and Termination), but is not necessarily one-step.
We first prove that Bosco satisfies Agreement, Unanimity, Validity, and Ter-
mination, when n > 3t.
Lemma 11. If two correct processors p and q decide values v and v′ in line 4, then
v = v′.
Proof. Assume otherwise, that two correct processors p and q decide values v
and v′ in line 4 such that v , v′. p and qmust have collected more than n+3t2 votes
for v and v′ each. Since there are only n processors in the system, these two sets
of votes share more than 3t2 common senders. Given that only t of these senders
can be Byzantine, more of t2 of these senders are correct processors. Since a
correct processor must send the same vote to all processors (in line 1), v = v′.
This is a contradiction. 
Lemma 12. If a correct processor p decides a value v in line 4, then any correct processor
q must set its local estimate to v in line 6.
Proof. Assume otherwise, that a correct processor p decides a value v in line 4,
and a correct processor q does not set its local estimate to v in line 6. Since
processor p decides in line 4, it must have collected more than n+3t2 votes for v in
line 2. Since processor q does not set its local estimate to v in line 6, it must have
collected no more than n−t2 votes for v, or collected more than
n−t
2 votes for some
value v′, v′ , v. For the first case, consider that since there are only n processors
in the system, processor q must have collected votes from at least n − 2t of the
senders that processor p collected from. Among these, more than n+t2 sent a vote
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for v to q. Since at most t of these processors can be Byzantine, processor qmust
have received more than n−t2 votes for v. This is a contradiction. For the second
case, if q collects more than n−t2 votes for some value v
′, v′ , v, then more than t
of these senders must be among those that sent a vote for v to processor q. This
is a contradiction, since, no more than t of the processors in the system can be
Byzantine. 
Theorem 13. Bosco satisfies Agreement.
Proof. There are two cases to consider. In the first case, no processor collects suf-
ficient votes containing the same value to decide in line 4. Thismeans that all de-
cisions occur in Underlying-Consensus. Since Underlying-Consensus
satisfies Agreement, Bosco satisfies Agreement. In the second case, some cor-
rect processor p decides some value v in line 4. By Lemma 11, any other pro-
cessor that decides in line 4 must decide the same value. By Lemma 12, all
correct processors must change their local estimates to v in line 6. Therefore,
all correct processors will invoke Underlying-Consensus with the value v.
Since Underlying-Consensus satisfies Unanimity, all correct processors that
decide in Underlying-Consensusmust also decide v. 
Theorem 14. Bosco satisfies Unanimity.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose a processor p decides v′, but all correct
processors have the same initial value v, v′ , v. Since only t Byzantine pro-
cessors can broadcast vote messages that contain v , v′, no correct processor
can collect sufficient votes to either decide in line 4 or to set its local estimate in
line 6. Therefore, in order for a processor to decide v, Underlying-Consensus
must allow correct processors to decide v even though all correct processors start
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Underlying-Consensuswith the initial value v′. This is a contradiction since
Underlying-Consensus satisfies Unanimity. 
Theorem 15. Bosco satisfies Validity.
Proof. If a processor decides v in line 4, more than n+3t2 processors voted v and
more than n+t2 of these processors are correct and had initial value v. Similarly, if
a processor sets its local estimate to v in line 6, more than n−t2 processors voted v
and more than n−3t2 of these processors are correct and had initial value v. Com-
bined with the fact that Underlying-Consensus satisfies Validity, Bosco sat-
isfies Validity. 
Note that satisfying Validity in general in a consensus protocol is non-trivial,
particularly if the range of initial values is large. A thorough examination of the
hardness of satisfying Validity is beyond the scope of this chapter; we simply
assume that Underlying-Consensus satisfies Validity for the range of initial
values that it allows.
Theorem 16. Bosco satisfies Termination.
Proof. Since each processor awaits messages from n − t processors in line 2,
and there can only be t failures, line 2 is guaranteed not to block for-
ever. Each processor will therefore invoke the underlying consensus pro-
tocol at some point. Therefore, Bosco inherits the Termination property of
Underlying-Consensus. 
Next, we show that Bosco offers strongly and weakly one-step properties
when n > 7t and n > 5t respectively.
60
Theorem 17. Bosco is Strongly One-Step if n > 7t.
Proof. Assume that all correct processors have the same initial value v. Now
consider any correct processor that collects n − t votes in line 2. At most t of
these votes can be from Byzantine processors and contain values other than v.
Therefore, all correct processors must obtain at least n − 2t votes for v. Since
n > 7t, 2n − 4t > n + 3t. This means that n − 2t > n+3t2 . Therefore, all correct
processors will collect sufficient votes and decide in line 4. 
Theorem 18. Bosco is Weakly One-Step if n > 5t.
Proof. Assume that there are no failures in the system and that all processors
have the same initial value v. Then any correct processor must collect n− t votes
that contain v in line 2. Given that n > 5t, 2n − 2t > n + 3t. This means that
n − t > n+3t2 . Therefore, all correct processors will collect sufficient votes and
decide in line 4. 
3.4 RS-Bosco and WS-Bosco
One important feature of Bosco, from which it draws its simplicity, is its depen-
dence on an underlying consensus protocol that it invokes as a subroutine. This
allows the specification of Bosco to be free of complicated mechanisms typically
found in consensus protocols to ensure correctness. While it is clear that any
Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol that provides Agreement, Unanim-
ity, Validity, and Termination can be used for the subroutine in Bosco, the FLP
impossibility result [25] states that such a protocol cannot actually exist! Two
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common approaches have been used to sidestep the FLP result: assuming par-
tial synchrony or relaxing the termination property to a probabilistic termina-
tion property. Thankfully, such algorithms can be used as subroutines to Bosco,
resulting in one-step algorithms that either require partial synchrony assump-
tions, or provide probabilistic termination properties (or both). An example
of an algorithm that can be used as a subroutine in Bosco is the Ben-Or algo-
rithm [9]. Algorithms that do not provide validity, such as PBFT [15], cannot be
used by Bosco.
While abstracting away the underlying consensus protocol simplifies the
specification and correctness proof of Bosco, for practical purposes it may be
advantageous to unroll the subroutine. This potentially allows piggybacking
of messages and improves the efficiency of implementations. As an example,
Algorithm 2 shows RS-Bosco, a randomized strongly one-step version of Bosco,
and Algorithm 3 shows RW-Bosco, a randomized weakly one-step version of
Bosco. Both RS-Bosco and RW-Bosco are not dependent on any underlying con-
sensus algorithms.
RS-Bosco is strongly one-step and requires that n > 7t, while RW-Bosco is
weakly one-step and requires that n > 5t. Both algorithms do not satisfy Termi-
nation as defined in section 3.1, but instead provides Probabilistic Termination:
Definition: Probabilistic Termination: All correct processors decide with
probability 1.
We note that RS-Bosco suffers from two limitations as currently constructed.
First, RS-Bosco solves only binary consensus. Second, RS-Bosco uses a local coin
to randomly update local estimates when a threshold of identical votes cannot
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be obtained. This mechanism is similar to that in the Ben-Or algorithm and
causes the algorithm to require an exponential number of rounds for decision
when contention is present. We believe that these limitations can be overcome
in practical implementations.
We present the proof of correctness for RW-Bosco. The corresponding proofs
for RS-Bosco are simpler and omitted for the sake of brevity.






Broadcast 〈VOTE, rp, xp〉 to all processors5
Collect n − t 〈VOTE, rp, ∗〉messages6
if more than n+3t2 VOTE msgs contain v then7
DECIDE(v)8
if more than n−t2 VOTE msgs contain v then9




Collect n − t 〈CANDIDATE, rp, ∗〉messages14
if at least t + 1 msgs are NOT of the form 〈CANDIDATE, rp, xp〉 then15
xp ←RANDOM() // pick randomly from {0,1}16
rp ← rp + 117
63
Algorithm 3: RW-Bosco: a randomized weakly one-step asynchronous
Byzantine consensus algorithm
Initialization: xp ← vp, rp ← 01
Round rp2
Broadcast 〈VOTE, rp, xp〉 to all processors3
Collect n − t messages of the form 〈VOTE, rp, ∗〉4
if at least dn+3t+12 e votes are of the form 〈VOTE, rp, v〉 then5
DECIDE(v)6
if at least d n−t+12 e votes are of the form 〈VOTE, rp, v〉 then7
Broadcast 〈CANDIDATE, rp, v〉8
else9
Broadcast 〈CANDIDATE, rp,⊥〉10
Collect n − t messages of the form 〈CANDIDATE, rp, ∗〉11
if at least d n+t+12 e VOTE msgs AND dn+t+12 e CANDIDATE msgs contain v then12
Broadcast 〈SUGGEST, rp, v〉13
else14
Broadcast 〈SUGGEST, rp,⊥〉15
Collect n − t messages of the form 〈SUGGEST, rp, ∗〉16
if at least d n+t+12 e SUGGEST msgs contain v then17
DECIDE(v)18
if at least t + 1 SUGGEST msgs contain v then19
xp ← v20
else if at least t + 1 messages are NOT of the form 〈CANDIDATE, rp, xp〉 then21
xp ←RANDOM()22
rp ← rp + 123
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Lemma 19. If a processor decides a value v in line 6 of Algorithm 3, then at least dn+t+12 e
correct processors have xp = v in the same round.
Proof. A processor that decides a value v in line 6 must have received dn+3t+12 e
votes for v (line 5). Of these votes, at most t can be from Byzantine processors.
Hence at least d n+t+12 e of these votes must be from correct processors, and these
correct processors must have xp = v. 
Lemma 20. If at least d n+t+12 e correct processors have xp = v in some round r, then in
any round r′ ≥ r, any processor p with an estimate xp = v will not change its xp.
Proof. If d n+t+12 e correct processors have xp = v in some round r, then all cor-
rect processors will receive at least dn−t+12 e votes of the form 〈VOTE, r, v〉 (line 7)
and hence send 〈CANDIDATE, r, v〉 (line 10). Therefore, any processor p with
xp = v will receive at most t messages (in line 15) that are not of the form
〈CANDIDATE, r, v〉 and hence not change its xp value in line 22. A correct process
will only change its value to v′ in line 20 if it receives t + 1 SUGGEST messages
containing the value v′. This means that at least one of the senders of those
messages is correct. Since a correct process will only send a SUGGEST message
containing value v′ if it receives dn+t+12 e VOTE messages containing value v′, and
d n+t+12 e correct processors have value xp = v, it must be the case that v = v′. There-
fore, in round r + 1, there will be, again, at least dn+t+12 e correct processors have
xp = v. By induction, all correct processors that have xp = vwill not update their
estimates in any round r′ ≥ r. 
Lemma 21. If a correct process decides a value v in line 18 in some round r, then all
correct processes will set xp to v in line 20 in round r.
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Proof. A correct process executes line 18 only if it receives dn+t+12 e SUGGESTmes-
sages containing v. This means that all other correct processes must receive at
least d n−t+12 e SUGGEST. Since n > 5t, all processes must execute line 20 and set xp
to v. 
Lemma 22. If a correct process decides a value v in line 18 in some round r, then no
correct process decided some value v′ , v.
Proof. By Lemma 21 and Lemma 20, if a process decides a value v in line 18,
it cannot be the case that at least dn+t+12 e correct processes have xp = v′ where
v′ , v. Therefore, by Lemma 19, it cannot be the case that some process decided
some value v′ in line 6 where v′ , v. If two processes decide values v and v′ in
round r, then they must both have received dn+t+12 e SUGGESTmessages contain-
ing the values v and v′ respectively. At least one of the messages received by
both processes must be from the same correct process, so v = v′. 
Theorem 23. Algorithm 3 satisfies Agreement.
Proof. Agreement follows immediately Lemma 20, Lemma 19, and Lemma 22.

Lemma 24. If all correct processors have the same local estimate v in round r, then all
correct processors decide v in round r.
Proof. If all correct processors have the same local estimate in some round r,
then all correct processes must receive at least dn+t+12 e VOTEmessages containing
value v and send a corresponding CANDIDATE message containing value v in
line 13. This will in turn cause all correct processes to send a SUGGESTmessage
containing the same value. Therefore, all correct processes will receive at least
d n+t+12 e SUGGESTmessages containing value v and decide in line 18. 
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Theorem 25. Algorithm 3 satisfies Unanimity and Validity.
Proof. Unanimity follows immediately from Lemma 24. The algorithm provides
an especially strong form of Validity in that it decides a value that was proposed
by one of the correct processors. This follows directly from Unanimity and the
fact that values are either 0 or 1. 
Lemma 26. In round r, if two correct processes p and q send SUGGEST messages in
round r containing the values v and v′ respectively, then v = v′.
Proof. Processes p and q send SUGGESTmessages because they received at least
d n+t+12 e VOTE messages containing v and v′ respectively. Since there are at most
t Byzantine processes, at least one of the messages received by both processes
were from the same correct sender. Hence, v = v′. 
Lemma 27. In round r, if two processes p and q update their local estimates xp and xq
to v and v′ respectively in line 20, then v = v′.
Proof. Processes p and q each received at least t + 1 SUGGESTmessages contain-
ing the values v and v′ respectively. At least one of the messages received by p
and one of the messages received by q must have been sent by correct senders.
By Lemma 26, they must contain the same value. 
Lemma 28. In a round r, if a correct process p sets xp ← v in line 20, then any correct
q with xq , v that does not update xq in line 20 must update xq in line 22.
Proof. Process p updates xp in line 20 because it receives t+1 SUGGESTmessages,
one of which must be from an honest sender. The honest sender must have
received d n+t+12 e CANDIDATE messages containing value v. This means that q
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must receive at least d n−3t+12 e CANDIDATEmessages containing value v and hence
execute line 22 if it does not execute line 20. 
Lemma 29. In some round r, if there are two correct processors p and q such that
xp , xq, then either p or q will update its estimate.
Proof. Assume otherwise. In a round r, there exists two correct processors p
and q such that xp , xq and neither p nor q executes line 20 or line 22. Without
loss of generality, assume that xp = 0 and xq = 1. Since p does not execute
line 22, at least n − 2t of the CANDIDATE messages collected by p in line 11 are
of the form 〈CANDIDATE, r, 0〉, n − 3t of which must have been sent by correct
processors. Given that q collects n − t messages, q must have received at least
n − 4t 〈CANDIDATE, r, 0〉messages. Since n > 5t, the equality test in line 12 must
hold for q and thus q must have executed line 22 if it did not execute line 20.
This is a contradiction. 
Theorem 30. Algorithm 3 satisfies Non-Blocking.
Proof. Non-Blocking holds because in the absence of unanimity, Lemma 29 says
that either all processes with a 0 estimate update their estimates; or all processes
with a 1 estimate update their estimates; or both. If, by non-zero chance, all cor-
rect processors update their estimate to the same value, then in the next round,
a decision is guaranteed by Lemma 24. 
Theorem 31. Algorithm 3 is weakly one-step if n > 5t.
Proof. If all correct processors have the same initial value v and there are no
Byzantine faults, then the number of votes containing the value v that are col-
lected in line 4 in the first communication step must be at least n − t. If n > 5t,
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then 2n − 2t > n + 3t, and thus n − t ≥ d n+3t+12 e. Therefore, all correct processors
must decide in the first communication step. 
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CHAPTER 4
K-SET AGREEMENT IN ONE COMMUNICATION STEP
Bosco was a one-step algorithm for a generalization of the consensus prob-
lem, where faulty processors can exhibit Byzantine failures in addition to crash
failures. The consensus problem can also be generalized in a different way.
Chaudhuri [21] introduced the k-set agreement problem where she relaxes the
requirement that a single unique value is decided by all correct processes. As
in consensus, processes propose values and each correct process has to decide
a value. However, in k-set agreement, rather than requiring that only a single
unique value is decided, up to k distinct values can be decided. In this chapter,
we look at the one-step algorithms in the context of this generalized version of
consensus.
We make two main contributions. First, we present the first algorithm for
one-step k-set agreement. While every consensus algorithm is a k-set agree-
ment algorithm, Keidar and Rajsbaum [39] showed that any consensus algo-
rithm must have a run that requires two communication steps even when pro-
posed values are restricted to {0, 1}. Thus no consensus algorithm is a one-step
k-set agreement algorithm, where k > 1. Second, while we do not prove a gen-
eral lower bound, we show that our algorithm is optimal for a natural class of
algorithms, characterizing how any better algorithm must differ.
Chaudhuri [21] proposed the k-set agreement problem to investigate
whether increasing the number of choices available to processors makes the
consensus problem easier. She showed that k-set agreement is indeed easier,
in the sense that correct algorithms exist that can tolerate k − 1 faults while the
FLP result shows that consensus algorithms can only tolerate 1 − 1 = 0 faults.
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In the same spirit, our investigation of one-step k-set agreement shows that it
is both easier and (possibly) harder than consensus. It is easier, in the sense that
there are more initial configurations that allow processors to decide in a single
round. For our algorithm, it is harder in the sense that the number of processors
needed to guarantee correctness is larger for most k > 1 than for k = 1. Whether
it is truly harder in this sense for all such algorithms remains an open problem.
4.1 k-Set Agreement
We assume a communication model as described in [25, 17]. We consider a fi-
nite set Π of n processors, namely, Π = {p1, ..., pn}. Processors communicate by
sending messages to one another via reliable communication channels. Proces-
sors and the network are fully asynchronous, that is, no assumptions are made
about the relative speed of processors, or the time it takes for a message to be
delivered. Up to f processors can fail by crashing, and a processor that crashes
stops sending messages and never recovers.
In the k-set agreement problem, each processor proposes a value vi, also called
its initial value, and all correct processes have to decide on some value v. The
objective of a k-set agreement protocol is to coordinate the decision of values
such that the properties of Validity, Termination, and k-Agreement hold. Validity
and Termination are defined in Section 3.1. k-Agreement is defined as follows:
Definition: k-Agreement: The set of values on which correct processors decide
has size at most k.
The difficulty of the k-set agreement problem depends on the relationship of
k, the maximum size of the set of distinct decided values, and f , the maximum
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number of failures. If f < k, the problem is trivially solvable for any n [20]. For
f ≥ k, a generalization of the FLP result shows that that the problem cannot be
solved if termination is required in all runs (rather than with probability 1) [12,
35]. We follow the approach of Mostefaoui and Raynal [58] who showed that
the problem can be solved by a randomized algorithm for n > 2 f +1. Alternative
approaches to relaxing the termination condition include using failure detectors
or establishing conditions that restrict the inputs to the problem [54, 55].
In addition, it is possible and desirable for protocols to allow processors to
decide in a single communication step when there is little contention among the
processors. More precisely, we define the following:
Definition: One-Step: If the set of initial values of processors has size at most k
then a one-step k-set agreement algorithm allows all correct processors to decide
in one communication step.
We call an algorithm that satisfies k-Agreement, Validity, Termination, and
One-Step a one-step k-set agreement algorithm. Note that the trivial algorithm for
f < k is a one-step algorithm; for the remainder of the chapter, we ignore the
trivial case and assume f ≥ k.
Assumption 1. f ≥ k
4.2 Lower Bounds
Wewill now define a class of k-set agreement protocols, namely popularity-based
protocols, and show that any popularity-based one-step k-set agreement proto-
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col must require more than f k − k2 + f + max( f + 1, 2k) processors in order to
tolerate f crashes.
Lemma 32. A one-step k-set agreement protocol must allow a correct processor to de-
cide after receiving no more than k distinct initial values from n − f processors.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there exists a run where a correct algorithm A
does not allow a processor p with initial value vp to decide after receiving at
most k different initial values from n − f processors. Since A is one-step and p
does not decide, there exist at least k + 1 distinct values, i.e., there exists some
processor q with initial value v′ that p did not receive in the first round. Now
consider a second run where p again receives at most k different initial values
from n − f processors, but where the remaining f processors have the same
initial value vp as p. Without blocking, p can wait for messages from at most
n − f processors. Thus, p must decide at this point. However, from the point
of view of p, this second run is indistinguishable from the first run. This is a
contradiction.

An insight from Lemma 32 is that any correct algorithm can be expressed in
the form shown in Algorithm 4. After receiving at most k distinct values among
n − f initial values, a correct processor must use some rule to decide on one of
them. A processor that does not decide in this step continues as specified by the
algorithm.
A natural decision rule is for the processor to decide the value for which it
received the most copies in step A2 (breaking ties using some ordering over val-
ues). We call a one-step k-set agreement algorithm using such a decision rule a
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Algorithm 4: The general form for any one-step k-set agreement protocol
Input: vp
A1 broadcast 〈vp〉 to all processors
A2 wait until n − f messages have been received
A3 if the messages contain at most k values then
A4 decide using DECISION RULE
A5 rest of algorithm
popularity-based algorithm, and give a lower bound on the number of processors
required for such algorithms. This does not rule out the possibility of a better
algorithm that uses a different decision rule.
Lemma 33. Any popularity-based algorithm requires n > f k − k2 + 2 f + 1.
We prove Lemma 33 by demonstrating a pair of runs in which an algorithm
is forced to make an inconsistent decision with lower values of n. To provide
insight before presenting the proof, we analyze the specific case of k = 1, where
the bound is n > 3 f . Note that this is equivalent to the bound for one-step
consensus shown in [13].
Consider a run of 3 f processors using some popularity-based algorithm A.
We divide the processors into three groups: G∗ contains f processors that crash
immediately;G1 contains f processors that have initial value v1; andG2 contains
f processors that have initial value v2. Given the Termination and k-Agreement
property of A, these processors must eventually decide a single value. WLOG,
let them decide v1.
Now consider a run where every processor in G∗ has value v2. f − 1 of the
processors send their value to the remaining processor p and then crash. p re-
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ceives f messages from processors in G∗ and f messages from processors in G2,
all with value v2, so it decides v2 in step A5. No other processor receives a mes-
sage from p. To all processors in G1 and G2, this run is indistinguishable from
the previous run, so they decide v1 violating 1-Agreement. We now construct
the proof by generalizing this example.
Proof. Consider a run of a popularity-based algorithmAwith n = f k−k2+2 f +1
processors. We divide the processors into k + 2 groups, namely, G1, ...,Gk+1, and
G∗. Each group Gi in {G1, . . . ,Gk+1} contains f − k + 1 processors that have initial
value vi, for a total of f k + f − k2 + 1 processors. The remaining f processors
are in G∗ and crash immediately. Each correct processor (processors not in G∗)
must eventually decide a value and the total number of decided values must
not exceed k. WLOG, let at least one processor decide vk+1.
Now consider a second run that is identical except that each processor
pi ∈ G∗ = {p1, . . . , p f } has initial value vi mod k. In step 2, each processor pi in
G∗ receives messages from all processors except all the processors in Gk+1 and
one processor in each of G j where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j , i. WLOG, assume the decision
rule breaks ties for the most popular value in step A4 by deciding the value vi
with the largest i. Then each processor pi ∈ G∗ decides its own value vi in step
4, by virtue of collecting more votes for vi than any other value, or by breaking
ties in favor of vi. Hence, every value v1, . . . , vk is decided by some processor.
The other n − f processors that are not in G∗ receive no messages from these
f processors, so this run in indistinguishable from the previous run. Thus at
least one processor decides vk+1, contradicting the k-Agreement property of the
algorithm. 
Lemma 34. Any popularity-based algorithm requires n > f k − k2 + f + 2k.
75
Again, for illustration, consider the case of k = 3 and f = 4. For these val-
ues of k and f , Lemma 33 requires n > 12. We show that this is not sufficient.
Consider n = 13. Again, WLOG, we assume that the decision rule breaks ties
by deciding the greatest value among the most popular. Consider a run where
the processors are divided into four groups: G1,G2,G3, andG4. G1 contains four
processors that have initial value v1, and each of G2, G3, and G4 contain three
nodes, with initial values v2, v3, and v4 respectively. It is not difficult to see that
there exists a run where the message delivery order causes two processors inG1
and one processor in each ofG3 andG4 to decide their initial value after the first
communication step. We refer to these early deciding processors asG∗. Now as-
sume that messages from processors in G∗ to all other processors are arbitrarily
delayed, such that other processors do not receive any messages fromG∗ before
deciding.
Given that processors in G∗ have decided values v1, v3, and v4, and k = 3,
all other processors must decide one of these values in order to satisfy k-
Agreement. WLOG, suppose some processor that’s not in G∗ decides v4. Now
consider another run, in which the processor in G∗ that decided v4 instead has
value v2 and decides v2. To all processors not in G∗, this run is indistinguishable
from the first, so some processor must decide v4. This violates k-Agreement and
is a contradiction.
Proof. Consider a run with n = f k − k2 + f + 2k. We divide the processors into
k + 1 groups, namely G1, . . . ,Gk+1 where processors in each group Gi have initial
value vi. Each of the first k− 2 groups have f − k+ 3 processors, and all the other
groups (Gk−1, Gk, and Gk+1) have f − k + 2 processors.
Now consider any processor in groups G1 . . .Gk−2. The order of message de-
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livery can occur in such a way that the processor decides its own initial value
in step A4: the processor receives all messages except from all the processors
in Gk+1, and a single processor in each of the groups G1 . . .Gk−2 that it does not
belong to. Since the processor sees no more than k different values in step A2
and its own initial value is the most common, it decides its initial value. Simi-
larly, depending on the order of message delivery, it is possible for a processor
in groupsGk and Gk+1 to decide its own initial value in step A4. Consider a pro-
cessor p in Gk. If in the first round, it receives all messages from all processors
except Gk+1 and one processor from each of G1 . . .Gk−2, then it would have seen
exactly k different values. Based on the tie breaking rule, it decides k. A pro-
cessor in Gk+1 can decide vk+1 based on a similar construction. Note that given
our assignment of initial values, processors inGk−1 cannot decide vk−1 in step A4
regardless of the order of message delivery.
Now consider a run where one processor in each of G1 . . .Gk+1 other than
Gk−1 decides its initial value in in step A4. We refer to these processors as G∗.
Assume that all messages from processors inG∗ to processors not inG∗ are arbi-
trarily delayed so that processors not in G∗ never receive any of those messages
before deciding. Since k different values (vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 2, k, k + 1) have been
decided in step A4 by processors in G∗, all processors that are not in G∗ must
eventually decide one of these values. Let one of these processors, pα, decide vα,
where vα , vk−1.
Now consider a second run, which is identical in every way to the run we
just described, except that the one processor inG∗ which decided vα now instead
has initial value vk−1, and decides vk−1 in step A4. This run is indistinguishable
from the previous run to all processors not in G∗, so pα must eventually decide
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vα. This violates k-Agreement and is a contradiction.

Combining Lemma 33 and Lemma 34 gives our lower bound.
Theorem 35. Any popularity-based algorithm requires n > f k−k2+ f +max( f +1, 2k).
4.3 Algorithm
Using the form presented in Section 4.2, we present one-step k-set agreement al-
gorithm that meets lower bound stated by Theorem 35. The algorithm is shown
here:
Algorithm 5: A one-step asynchronous k-set agreement protocol
Input: vp
B1 broadcast 〈vp〉 to all processors
B2 wait until n − f messages have been received
B3 Vp ← highest value among those received in the most messages
B4 if the messages contain at most k values then
B5 DECIDE(Vp)
B6 Underlying-Consensus(Vp)
The algorithm differs from the skeleton described in Section 4.2 in two im-
portant ways. First, we flesh out the decision rule that is used to decide a value.
In particular, as in all popularity-based algorithms, each node collects n− f mes-
sages and count the number of messages that contain each distinct value, and
decide on the most popular one. If there is a tie between multiple values, the
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greatest value is used. Second, after attempting to decide in the first round, each
node then proceeds to run some protocol that solves the standard agreement
problem. This can be any standard agreement protocol, with the one caveat be-
ing that the protocol must solve multi-value consensus (as opposed to binary
consensus) and satisfy Validity, as defined in Section 4.1. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the underlying consensus algorithm relies on randomization and uses
no failure detectors, but the algorithm is also correct if failure detector-based al-
gorithms are used.
We now prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Assumption 2. n > f k − k2 + f +max(2k, f + 1)
Assumption 3. The underlying consensus protocol satisfies Validity, 1-Agreement,
and Termination for n > f k − k2 + f +max(2k, f + 1) ≥ 3 f .
Theorem 36. Algorithm 5 satisfies Validity
Proof. If a processor decides in step B5, it decides on some value vp it received in
a message 〈vp〉. Otherwise it decides in step B6. Since the underlying consensus
protocol satisfies Validity, it decides on the value v′p of some processor p′. p′
received this value in some message 〈v′p〉. In either case, it decides on the value
sent in some message, which is the input of some processor. 
To show agreement, we first consider only runs where there are exactly k + 1
distinct initial values. For such runs, let x be the number of processors that start
with the least popular value.
Lemma 37. Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement in runs with k + 1 initial values where
x > f − k + 2.
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Proof. There is at least one value (the least popular) with which x processors
start. If in step B2 a processor receives messages from all but the x processors
with some value that only appears x times, it will decide the most popular value
in step 5. In order to decide some other value, it must not receive amessage from
at least one processor with the most popular value, in which case it will decide
the second most popular value. Since all x messages of a particular value must
not be received by a processor that decides in step B5, such a processor can
only miss messages containing f − x other distinct values. Thus, at most the
f − x + 1 ≤ f − ( f − k + 3) + 1 = k − 2most popular values can be decided in this
fashion.
If the k−2most popular values can be decided and the (k−2)th most popular
value appears exactly x times, then the (k − 1)th most popular value can also be
decided by having the value for which no messages are received be the (k −
2)th most popular value. This requires using all f failures, so a maximum of
k − 1 distinct values can be decided in step B5. By the 1-Agreement property of
the underlying consensus protocol, only one value will be decided in step B6.
Therefore, at most k values will be decided in total. 
Lemma 38. Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement in runs with k + 1 initial values where
x = f − k + 2.
Proof. If the (k − 1)th most popular value appears more than x times, then the
argument in the proof of Lemma 37 shows that at most k − 1 values will be
decided in step B5 and so k-Agreement is satisfied.
Suppose that the (k − 1)th most popular value appears exactly x times. By
Assumption 2, n > f k − k2 + f + 2k. Since x = f − k + 2, n − x(k + 1) > k − 2.
At least x processors have each value and the (k − 1)th, kth and (k + 1)th most
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popular values appear exactly x times, so the k − 2 most popular values must
appear at least a total of (k − 2)x + k − 1 times. If a processor decides a value that
is not one of the k − 2 most popular, it must have received at most x messages
from processors with each of these values. Thus it must not receive at least k− 1
messages from such processors and a further x = f − k + 2 messages so that it
does not receive more than k distinct values. This means it did not receive a total
of f + 1 messages, which is not possible. Thus in this case at most k − 2 values
can be decided and Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement.

Lemma 39. Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement in runs with k + 1 initial values where
x < f − k + 2.
Proof. By Assumption 2, n > f k− k2+ f + ( f +1). Since x < f − k+2, n > xk+ f + x.
x processors start with the least popular value, so a total of at least xk + f + 1
processors start with the remaining k values. Every processor must receive at
least xk + f + 1 − f = xk + 1 messages from these processors in step B4 and thus
receive at least x+1messages for one of the kmost popular values. Thus in step
B3, Vp will be set to one of these k values for each processor. Any decided value
was set in step B3 by some processor, so Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement. 
Theorem 40. Algorithm 5 satisfies k-Agreement
Proof. Lemmas 37, 38, and 39 prove k-Agreement for runs where there are ini-
tially exactly k + 1 distinct initial values. Runs with less than k + 1 initial val-
ues trivially satisfy k-Agreement because Algorithm 5 satisfies Validity (Theo-
rem 4.3).
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Consider a run with more than k+ 1 initial values that violates k-Agreement.
We complete the proof by showing that there must exist a run with k + 1 initial
values that violates k-Agreement.
If a run violates k-Agreement then either (1) at least k + 1 values are decided
in step B5 or (2) k values are decided in step B5 and some processor p set Vp to
a value not among those k in step B3. In the first case, let S be the set consisting
of k + 1 values that are decided in step B5 and and let v⊥ be the least popular
among them (breaking ties by selecting the greatest value). Now consider the
run where each processor p has value v′p = vp if vp ∈ S and v′p = v⊥ otherwise.
There exists an order of message deliveries that will cause the same k + 1 values
to be decided in the second run. In particular, a process that decides must re-
ceive messages with only k distinct values. In the first run, either each process
that decided on a value in S received no messages from any processor with a
value not in S or it does not receive any messages with at least two of the values
in S (because it received a message with some other value). These messages
can be replaced by messages containing values in S . Thus there is a run which
violates k-Agreement and has only k + 1 initial values.
For the second case, we use a similar construction. Now S is the set of k
values decided in step B5 and v⊥ is the value some processor p set Vp to in step
B3 that is not in S . Define the initial values for the second run as before. By
the same argument, there is an ordering of message deliveries that will cause
the k distinct values to still be decided in step B5. Furthermore, p cannot receive
fewer messages with value v⊥ in the second run than it did in the first run, so the
value it computes in step B3 will still be v⊥. Thus there is a run which violates
k-Agreement and has only k + 1 initial values. 
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Theorem 41. Algorithm 5 satisfies Termination
Proof. Since each processor awaits messages from n− f processors in step B2, and
there can only be f failures, step B2 is guaranteed not to block forever. Each pro-
cessor will therefore invoke the underlying consensus protocol at some point.
Therefore, Algorithm 5 inherits the Termination property of the underlying con-
sensus protocol. 
Theorem 42. Algorithm 5 satisfies One-Step
Proof. Suppose the processors have at most k different initial values. Then in
step B2, each processor will receive at most k different values. Thus each pro-
cessor will decide in step B5. 
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CHAPTER 5
RPC CHAINS: EFFICIENT CLIENT-SERVER COMMUNICATION IN
GEODISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Distributed enterprise applications, such as web applications, are often built
from more basic services, such as storage services, database management sys-
tems, authentication and configuration services, and services for interfacing
with external components (e.g., credit card processing, banking, vendors, etc).
As systems become larger, more complex, and more ubiquitous, there is a corre-
sponding increase in the number, diversity, and geographical dispersion of the
remote services that they use. For instance, Hotmail and Live Messenger share
an address book service and an authentication service; there are also services
specialized for each application, say, for email storage or virus scanning. These
services are heterogeneous; they are often developed by different teams and are
geo-distributed, running in different parts of the world.
Geo-distribution provides many benefits: high availability, disaster toler-
ance, locality, and ability to scale beyond one data center or site. However,
the thin and slow links connecting different sites pose challenges, especially in
an enterprise setting, where applications have strict performance requirements.
For instance, web applications should ideally respond within one second [60].
The most common primitives for inter-service communication are remote
procedure calls (RPC’s) or RPC-like mechanisms. RPC’s can impose undesir-
able communication patterns and overheads when a client needs to make mul-
tiple calls to servers. This is because RPC’s impose communication of the form
A−B−A (A calls B which returns to A) even though this pattern may not be op-













Figure 5.1: Standard RPCs vs an RPC chain
utively call servers B, C, and D in site 2. Server B, in turn, calls servers E and
F in site 3. The use of RPC’s forces the execution to return to A and B multiple
times, causing 10 crossings of inter-site links
We propose a simple but more general communication primitive called a
Chain of Remote Procedure Calls, or simply RPC chain, which allows a client to call
multiple servers in succession (A−B1−B2− · · · −A), where the request flows from
server to server without involving the client every time. The result is a much
improved communication pattern, with fewer communication hops, lower end-
to-end latency, and often lower bandwidth consumption. In Figure 5.1, we see
how an RPC chain reduces the number of inter-site crossings to 4. The example
in this figure is representative of a web mail application, where host A is a web
server that retrieves a message from an email server B, then retrieves an associ-
ated calendar entry from a calendar service C, and finally retrieves relevant ads
from an ad server D.
The key idea of RPC chains is to embed the chaining logic as part of the RPC
call. This logic can be a generic function, constrained by some simple isolation
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mechanisms. RPC chains have three important features:
• (1) Server modularity. What made RPC’s so successful is the clean decou-
pling of server code, which allows servers to be developed independently
of each other and the client. RPC chains preserve this attribute, even al-
lowing existing legacy RPC’s to be part of a chain through simple wrap-
pers.
• (2) Chain composability. If a server in the chain itself wishes to call another
server, this nested call can be simply added to the chain in flux. In Fig-
ure 5.1, when client A starts the chain, it intends to call only servers B, C,
and D. But server B wants to call servers E and F, and so it adds them to
the chain.
• (3) Chain dynamicity. The services that a host calls need not be defined a
priori; they can vary dynamically during execution. In the left figure, the
fact that client A calls servers C and D need not be known before A calls
server B; it can depend on the result returned by B. For example, an error
condition may cause a chain to end immediately instead of continuing on
to the next server.
We demonstrate RPC chains through a storage and a web application. For
the storage application, we show how a storage server can be enabled to use
RPC chains, and we give a simple use in which a client can copy data between
servers without having to handle the data itself. This speeds up the copying and
saves significant bandwidth. For the web application, we implement a simple
web mail service that uses chains to reduce the overheads of an ad server.
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5.1 Setting
We consider enterprise systems that span geographically-diverse sites, where
each site is a local area network. Sites are connected to each other through thin-
ner and slower wide area links. Wide-area links can be made faster by improv-
ing the underlying network, and lots of progress has been made here, but this
progress is hindered by economic barriers (e.g., legacy infrastructure), techno-
logical obstacles (e.g., switching speeds), and fundamental physical limitations
(e.g., speed of light). Thus, the large discrepancy between the performance of
local and wide-area links will continue.
Unlike the Internet as a whole, enterprise systems operate in a trusted envi-
ronment with a single administrative domain and experience little churn. These
systems may contain a wide range of services, often developed by many differ-
ent teams, including general services for storage, database management, au-
thentication, and directories, as well as application-specific services, such as
email spam detection, address book management, and advertising. These ser-
vices are often accessed using RPC’s, which we broadly define as a mechanism
in which a client sends a request to a server and the server sends back a reply.
This definition includes many types of client-server interactions, such as the in-
teractions in CORBA, COM, REST, SOAP, etc.
In enterprise environments, application developers are not malicious though
some level of isolation is desirable so that a problem in one application or service




Servers provide services in the form of service functions, which is the general
term we use for remote procedures, remote methods, or any other processing
units at servers. An RPC chain calls a sequence of service functions, possibly at
different servers. Service functions are connected together via chaining functions,
which specify the next service function to execute in a chain (see Figure 5.2 top).
Chaining functions are provided by the client and executed at the server. They
can be arbitrary C# methods with the restriction that they be stand-alone code,
that is, code which does not refer to non-local variables and functions, so that
they can be compiled by themselves.
We chose this general form of chaining for two reasons. First, we want to
allow the chain to unfold dynamically, so that the choice of next hop depends
on what happens earlier in the chain. For example, an error at a service function
could shorten a chain. Second, we wanted to support server modularity, so that
services and client applications can be developed independently. Thus, a server
may not produce output that is immediately ready for another server, in theway
intended by the client’s application. One may need to convert formats, reorder
parameters, combine them, or even combine the outputs from several servers
in the chain. For example, an NFS server does not output data in the format ex-
pected by a SQL server: one needs glue that will convert the output, choose the
tables, and add the appropriate SQL wrapper, according to application needs.
Chaining functions provide this glue. We initially considered a simpler alterna-




// parmlist: parameter list
// chaining function
nexthop cf(object state, object result)
// state: from client or earlier parts of chain
// result: from last preceding service function
// returns next chain hop:
// (server, sf name, parmlist,
// cf name, state)
chain id start chain(machine t server,
string sf name, object parmlist,
string cf name, object state)
Figure 5.2: Signature of a service function and chaining function; signature









































Figure 5.3: Execution of an RPC chain.
to call, but this design does not address the issues above. We also note that it is
easy to translate a static server list into the appropriate chaining functions (one
could even write a programmer tool that automatically does that), so our design
includes static lists as a special case.
Figure 5.3 shows how an RPC chain executes. (1) A client calls our RPCC
(RPC chain) library, specifying a server, a reference to a service function sf1 at
that server, its parameters, and a chaining function cf1. (2) This information is
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then sent to the chosen server. (3) The server executes service function sf1, which
(4) returns a result. (5) This result is passed to the chaining function cf1, which
then (6) returns the next server, service function, and chaining function, and (7)
the chain continues.
For example, suppose client A wants to call service functions sfB, sfC, sfD at
servers B, C, and D, in this order. To do so, the client specifies a reference to
sfB and a chaining function cf1. cf1 causes a call to sfC at server C with a chain-
ing function cf2, which in turn causes a call to sfD at server D with a chaining
function cf3, which causes the final result to be returned to the client A.
5.2.2 Chaining function repository
Chaining functions are provided by clients but executed at servers. To save
bandwidth, in our implementation the client does not send the actual code to
the server. Rather, the client uploads the code to a repository, and sends a ref-
erence to the server; the server downloads the code from the repository and
caches it for subsequent use. The repository stores chaining functions in source
code format, which is then compiled by servers at runtime using the reflection
capabilities of .NET/C# (Java has similar capabilities).
Storing source code introduces fewer dependencies, is more robust (binary
formats change more frequently), and simplifies debugging. Because the cost of
runtime compilation can be significant (≈50 ms, see Section 5.4.2), servers cache
the compiled code, not the source code, to avoid repeated compilations.
When the chaining function is very small, it can be transmitted by the client
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with the RPC chain, so that the server does not have to contact the repository.
5.2.3 Parameters and state
A chaining function is client logic that may depend on run-time variables, ta-
bles, or other state from the client or earlier parts of the chain. This state needs
to be passed along the chain, and should ideally be small, otherwise its trans-
mission cost can outweigh the benefits of an RPC chain (see Section 5.4.2). We
represent the state as a set of name-value pairs, which is passed as a parameter
to the chaining function (see Figure 5.2).
The output of each service function is also passed as a parameter to the sub-
sequent chaining function. For example, in our storage copy application (Sec-
tion 5.3.1), the first service function reads a file, and the chaining function uses
the result as input to the next service function, which writes to a file on a differ-
ent server. In our email application, a service function reads an email message,
and the chaining function adds the message to the state of the next chaining
function, so that the message is passed along the chain back to the chain origi-
nator (a mail web server).
5.2.4 Nesting and composition
RPC chains can be nested: a service function in a chain may itself start a sub-
chain. For example, the main chain could call a storage service, which then
needs to call a replica. We implement nesting so that a nested chain can be














Figure 5.4: Composition of nested chains.
shows two chains, a main chain 1 and a sub-chain 2. On the right, the two
chains are composed together. (I) marks where B starts a sub-chain, and (II)
shows where the sub-chain ends and the main chain resumes.
Note the difference between starting a chain going from B to E, and moving
to the next host in a chain going from C to D: the former occurs when the service
function at B starts a new chain, while the latter occurs when the chaining function
at C calls the next node in the chain. This distinction is important because the
service function at B represents a native procedure at the service, while a chain-
ing function at C represents logic coming from A. At E, the chaining function
that calls F represents logic coming from B.
To compose a chain with its sub-chain, the chaining function of the parent
chain needs to be invoked when a sub-chain ends (to continue the parent chain).
Accordingly, when a host starts a sub-chain, the RPCC library saves the chaining
function and its state parameter, and passes them along the sub-chain. The sub-
chain ends when its chaining function returns null in nexthop.server, and a
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result in nexthop.state (this is the result that the host originating the sub-chain
must produce for the parent chain). When that happens, the RPCC library calls
the saved chaining function with the saved state and nexthop.state.
It is important to note that a chain and a sub-chain are not necessarily aware
of each other. For example, in Figure 5.4, the fact that the service function at B
launches a sub-chain has little to do with the parent chain that called the service
at B.
To allow multiple levels of nesting, we use a chain stack that stores the saved
chaining function and its state for each level of composition. The stack is
popped as each sub-chain ends.
5.2.5 Support for legacy RPC services
To support legacy services with standard RPC interfaces, we use a simple wrap-
per module, installed at the legacy RPC server, which includes the RPCC library
and exposes the legacy remote procedures as service functions.
Each service function passes requests and responses to and from the corre-
sponding legacy remote procedure. Because the service function calls the legacy
remote procedure locally through the RPC’s standard network interface (e.g.,
TCP), the legacy server will see all requests as coming from the local machine,
and this can affect network address-based server access control policies. (This
is not a problem if access control is based on internal RPC authenticators, such
as signatures or tokens, which can be passed on by the wrapper.)
One solution is to re-implement the access control mechanism at the wrap-
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per, but this is application-specific. A better solution is for the wrapper to fake
the network address of its requests and capture the remote procedure’s output
before it is placed on the network.
5.2.6 Isolation
Chaining functions are pieces of client code running at servers. Even though
clients are trustworthy in the environment we consider, they are still prone to
buffer overruns, crashes, and other problems. Thus, chaining functions are
sandboxed to provide isolation, so that client code cannot crash or otherwise
adversely affect the server on which it runs.
We need two types of isolation: (1) restricting access to sensitive functions,
such as file and network I/O and privileged operating system calls, and (2)
restricting excessive consumption of resources (CPU and memory).
We achieve (1) through direct support by .NET/C# of access restrictions to
file I/O, system and environment variables, registry, clipboard, sockets, and
other sensitive functions (Java has similar capabilities). This is accomplished by
placing descriptive annotations, called attributes, in the source code of chaining
functions when they are compiled at run-time.
We achieve (2) by monitoring CPU and memory utilization and checking
that they are within preset values. The appropriate values are a matter of policy
at the server, but for the short-lived type of executions that we target with RPC
chains, chaining functions should consume at most a few CPU seconds and
hundreds of megabytes of memory, even in the most extreme cases.
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If a chaining function violates restrictions on access or resource consump-
tion, an RPC chain exception is thrown according to the mechanism in Sec-
tion 5.2.8.
5.2.7 Debugging and profiling
A very useful debugging tool for traditional applications is “printf”, which al-
lows an application to display messages on the console. We provide an anal-
ogous facility for RPC chain applications: a virtual console, where nodes in the
chain can log debugging information. The contents of the virtual console are
sent with the chain, and eventually reach the client, which can then dump the
contents to a real console or file. The virtual console can also be used to gather
profiling information for each step in the chain and be aggregated at the client.
Even with “printf”, debugging RPC chains can be hard, because it involves
distributed execution over multiple machines. We can reduce this problem to
the simpler problem of debugging RPC-based code by running RPC chains in
a special interactive mode. The key observation is that chaining functions are
portable code that can be executed at any machine. In interactive mode, chaining
functions always execute at the client instead of the servers. To accomplish this,
after each service function returns, the RPCC library sends its result back to
the client, which then applies the chaining function to continue the chain from
there. A chain executed in interactive mode looks like a series of RPC calls.
By running the client in an interactive debugger, the developer can control the




An RPC chain may encounter exceptional conditions while it is executing: (1)
the next server in the chain can be down, (2) the chaining function repository
can be down, or (3) the state passed to the chaining function can be missing vital
information due to a bug. All of these will result in an exception, either at the
RPCC library in cases (1) and (2), or at a chaining function in case (3). (Service
functions do not throw exceptions; they simply return an error to the caller.)
Who should handle such exceptions? One possibility is to handle them lo-
cally, by having the client send exception handling code as part of the chain.
Doing this requires sending all the state that the handling code needs, which
complicates the application design. Instead, we choose a less efficient but sim-
pler alternative (since exceptions are the rare case). We simply propagate excep-
tions back to the client that started the chain. The client receives the exception
name, its parameters, and the path of hosts that the chain has traversed thus far.
(If the client crashes, the exception becomes moot and is ignored.)
In the case of nested chains, the exception propagates first to the host that
started the current sub-chain. If that host does not catch the exception, it con-
tinues propagating to the host that started the parent chain, until it gets to the
client. For example, in Figure 5.4 right, if E throws an exception (say, because
it could not contact F), the exception goes to B, the node that created the sub-
chain. This is a natural choice because B understands the logic of the sub-chain
that it created, and so it may know how to recover from the exception. If B does
not catch the exception, it is propagated to A.
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5.2.9 Broken chains
The crash of a host while it executes an RPC chain results in a broken chain. These
broken chains must be detected and handled gracefully.
Detection. We detect a broken chain using a simple end-to-end timeout
mechanism at the client called chain heartbeats: a chain periodically sends an
alive message to the client that created it, say every 3 seconds, and the client
uses a conservative timeout of 6 seconds. If there are sub-chains, only the top-
level creator gets the heartbeats. Heartbeats carry a unique chain identifier, a
pair consisting of the client name and a timestamp, so that the client knows to
which chain it refers.
We achieve the periodic sending through a time-to-heartbeat timer, which
is sent with the chain, and it is decremented by each node according to its pro-
cessing time, until it reaches 0, the time to send a heartbeat. Synchronized clocks
are not needed to decrement the timer; we only need clocks that run at approx-
imately the same speed as real time. Since we do not know link delays, we as-
sume a conservative value of 200 ms and decrement the time-to-heartbeat timer
by this amount for every network hop. This assumption may be violated when
if there is congestion and dropped packets, resulting in a premature timeout
(false positive). However, the impact of false positives is small because of our
recovery mechanism, explained next.
Recovery. To recover from a broken chain, the client simply retransmits the
request. Like standard remote procedures, we make chains idempotent by in-
cluding a chain-id with each chain, and briefly caching the results of service
functions and chaining functions at each server. If a server sees the same chain-
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id, it uses the cached results for the service and chaining functions. The chain
can continue in this fashion up to the host where the chain previously broke. At
that host, if the “next” host is still down, an exception is thrown. Alternatively,
a fail-over mechanism that calls a backup server can be implemented by using
logical server names which are mapped to a backup when the primary fails.
This is similar to the mechanisms used to fail over standard RPC’s.
Upon a second timeout, a client executes the RPC chain in interactive mode
(as in Section 5.2.7), to determine exactly at which node the chain stopped, and
returns an error to the application.
5.2.10 Splitting chains
For performance reasons, it may be desirable to split a chain to allow parallel
execution. The decision to split a chain should be made with consideration of
the added complexity, as concurrent computations are always harder to under-
stand, design, debug, and maintain compared to sequential computations. Al-
though our applications do not use splitting chains, we now explain how such
chains can be implemented.
Split. We modify chaining functions so that they can return more than one
nexthop parameter. The RPCC library calls each nexthop concurrently, result-
ing in the several split-chains. Each chain has an id comprised of the id of the
parent plus a counter. For example, if there is a 3-way split of chain 74, the split-
chains will have ids 74.1, 74.2, and 74.3. Each of these split chains can in turn be
split again, and result in split-chains with increasingly long ids. For example,
if split-chain 74.1 splits into two, the resultant split-chains will have ids 74.1.1
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and 74.1.2. We note for future reference that each split-chain knows how many
siblings it has (this information is passed on to the split-chains when the chain
splits).
Broken split chains. Recall that we use an end-to-end mechanism to han-
dle broken chains (Section 5.2.9) via a chain heartbeat. When a chain splits, we
also split the heartbeats: each split-chain sends its own heartbeat (with the split-
chain id) and the client will be content only if it periodically sees the heartbeat
from all the split-chains. The heartbeat messages indicate the number of sib-
ling split-chains, so that the client knows how many to expect. If a split-chain
is missing, the client starts the chain again (even if other split-chains are still
running, this does not cause a problem because of idempotency).
Merge. To merge split-chains, a merge host collects the results of each split-
chain and invokes a merge function to continue the chain. The merge host and
function are chosen when the chain splits (they are returned by the chaining
function causing the split). The merge host can be any host; a good choice is
the next host in the chain. The merge host awaits outcomes from all split-chains
before calling the merge function, which takes the vector of results and returns
nexthop, specifying the next service function and chaining function to call.
After split-chains complete (i.e., reach the merge host), the parent chain will
continue and resume its heartbeats. However, split-chains do not necessarily
complete at the same time, so there may be a period from when the first split-
chain completes until the parent chain resumes. During this period the merge
host sends heartbeats on behalf of the completed split-chains, so that the client
does not time out.
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Crash garbage. When there are crashes in the system, the merge host may
end up with the outcome of stale split-chains. This garbage can be discarded
after a timeout: as we mentioned, RPC chains are intended for short-lived com-
putations, so we propose a timeout of a minute. Note that if a slow system
causes a running chain to be garbage collected, the client will recover after it
times out.
5.3 Applications
To demonstrate RPC chains, we apply and evaluate them in two important en-
terprise applications: a storage application (Section 5.3.1) and a web application
(Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Storage applications
Storage services generally provide two basic functions, read and write, based on
keys, file names, object id’s, or other identifiers. While this generic interface is
suitable for many applications, its low-level nature sometimes forces bad data
access patterns on applications. For instance, if a client wants to copy a large
object from one storage server to another, the client must read the object from
one server and write it to the other, causing all the data to go through the client.
If the client is separated from the storage servers by a high latency or low band-
width connection, this copying could be very slow.
One solution is to modify the storage service on a case-by-case basis for





















Figure 5.5: Copying data between two storage servers using RPCs, RPC
chains, and RPC chains with composition.
age service recently added a new copy operation to its interface [4], so that
an end user can efficiently copy her data between data centers in the US and
Europe, without having to transfer data through her machine. Although such
application-specific interfaces can be beneficial, they are specific to particular
operations and do not mitigate adverse communication patterns in other set-
tings.
RPC chains provide a more general solution: they not only enable the direct
copying of data from one server to another (through a simple chain that reads
and then writes), but also enable broader uses. To demonstrate this idea, we
layered RPC chains over a legacy NFS v3 storage server, as explained in Sec-
tion 5.2.5. (We could have used other types of storage, such as an object store.)
We then implemented a simple chain to copy data without passing through the
client.
We also show a more sophisticated application of chains by implementing a
primary-backup replication of the storage server: when the primary receives a
write request, it creates a chain to apply the request on a backup server. Because
replication is done through chains, it can be composed with other chains. This
is illustrated in Figure 5.5(b), which shows a setup with two storage servers,
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the second of which is replicated, and a user who wants to copy data from the
first to the second server. Two chains are created as a result of this request: a
chain that the client launches for copying, and another that the second storage
server launches for replication. The RPCC library allows these two chains to be
composed together, as shown in Figure 5.5(c). We report on quantitative benefits
of our approach in Section 5.4.3.
5.3.2 Web mail application
Web applications are generally composed of multiple tiers or services: there are
front-end web servers, authentication servers, application servers, and storage
and database servers. Some of these tiers, namely the web servers and applica-
tion servers, play the role of orchestrating other tiers, and they tend to keep very
little user state of their own, other than soft session state. This is a propitious
setting for RPC chains, because performance gains can be realized by optimiz-
ing the communication patterns of the various services. We demonstrate this
point with a sample application.
We consider a typical web mail application. There are web servers that han-
dle HTTP requests, authentication servers and address-book servers that are
shared with other applications, email storage servers that store the users’ mail,
and ad servers that are responsible for displaying relevant ads. These services
can be located in multiple data centers, for several reasons: (1) no single data
center can host them all; (2) a service may have been developed in a particular
location and so it is hosted close by; (3) for performance reasons, it may be de-



























Figure 5.6: A simplified web mail server that uses RPC chains.
Asia may have their mailbox stored in Asia), though this is not always achiev-
able (e.g., an Asian user travels to the U.S. and his mailbox is still in Asia); and
(4) a service may need high availability or the ability to withstand disasters.
We implemented a simple web mail service as shown in Figure 5.6, to study
the benefits of RPC chains in such a setting. Our web mail system consists of
a front-end server that authenticates users by verifying their logins and pass-
words. Upon successful authentication, the front-end server returns a cookie
to the client along with the name of an email server. The client then uses the
cookie to communicate with the email server to send and receive email mes-
sages. Upon receiving a client request, the email server first verifies the cookie,
then calls the back-end storage server to fetch the appropriate emails for the
user. Finally, the mail server sends the message to an ad server so that relevant
ads can be added to the messages before they are returned to the client.
Note that the adding of ads to emails imposes a significant overhead on per-
formance. This is of particular concern because one of the primary performance
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goals of a webmail service is to minimize the response time observed by clients.
In addition, emails and ads cannot be fetched in parallel, since relevant ads can-
not be selected without knowing the contents of the emails. It is also difficult
to pre-compute the relevant ads because the relevance of ads may change over
time.
Using RPC chains, we can mitigate some of the ad-related overheads. Even
though we can only fetch ads after fetching the emails, we can eliminate one
latency hop from the communication path of the web mail application by cre-
ating a chain that causes emails to be sent directly from the storage server to
the ad server, without having to go through to email server (as shown in step
7 of Figure 5.6). Once the ad server has appended the appropriate ads to the
emails, the emails can be sent to the email server which then returns it to the
client. In Section 5.4.4, we evaluate the benefit of using RPC chains to improve
the communication pattern in this fashion.
5.4 Evaluation
We now evaluate RPC chains. We start with some microbenchmarks, in which
we measure the overhead of chaining functions and we compare RPC chains
versus standard RPC’s. We then evaluate the storage and web applications to
demonstrate the performance improvements provided by RPC chains. The gen-
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Mt. View 6.3 MB/s 2.1 MB/s 1.4 MB/s
Redmond 8.5 MB/s 8.6 MB/s
Beijing 2.4 MB/s
Figure 5.7: Latency and bandwidth between pairs of sites.
5.4.1 Setup
Our experimental setup consists of tenmachines in four geodistributed sites in a
corporate network that spans the globe. We had machines in 4 sites: (1) Moun-
tain View, California, USA, (2) Redmond, Washington, USA, (3) Cambridge,
United Kingdom, and (4) Beijing, China. The measured latency and throughput
of the links between these sites are shown in Figure 5.7.
5.4.2 Microbenchmarks
Overhead of chaining functions
In our first experiment, we evaluate the overhead imposed by chaining func-
tions (pieces of client code) at servers. We considered chaining functions of
three sizes, 621 bytes, 5 KB, and 50 KB, corresponding to small, medium, and
large functions.
We first measured the time it takes to compile a function at run-time. The
results are shown in the first two columns of Figure 5.8, averaged over 10 runs
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Source size Compile time Compiled size
(KB) (ms) (KB)
0.6 45.7 ± 0.3 0.4
5 47.1 ± 0.4 4.6
50 76.0 ± 0.3 15.9
Figure 5.8: Overhead for compiling chaining functions and storing com-
piled code.
(± refers to standard error). We used a 3 Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo processor running
Windows Vista Enterprise SP1. The functions were written in C# and compiled
using Microsoft Visual Studio 2008.
We also did a linear regression with a larger set of points (17 sizes, with 10
runs each) and found that the cost of compilation is 44.8 ms plus 1 ms for each
5000 bytes of source code. We see that there is a large initial compilation cost of
tens of milliseconds, which we do not want to pay every time we call the server
in a chain.
We measured the size of the compiled code, shown in the third column of
Figure 5.8. We see that it is very small (we initially thought it would be large,
but this is not the case). This allows the server to cache even tens of thousands
of chaining functions in less than 50 MB, which justifies our choice of doing so.
RPC chain versus standard RPC
In our next experiment, we compare the latency of an RPC chain versus stan-
dard RPC. We used the smallest non-trivial chain, which goes through two
servers (A chain that goes through only one server is the same as an RPC),









Figure 5.9: Executions used in the experiment of Section 5.4.2.
as shown in Figure 5.9. To isolate concerns, the service executed at each server
is a no-op.
The figure makes it clear that the RPC chain incurs one fewer hop than the
pair of RPC calls. What is not shown is that the RPC chain has potentially two
overheads that the pair of RPC calls do not: (1) even if the client needs the
response from server 1 but server 2 does not, the data is still relayed through
server 2, and (2) the client needs to send state for the chaining function to exe-
cute at server 1. The first overhead can be avoided through a simple extension
to RPC chains to allow each server in the chain to send some data to the client. i
We now consider the second overhead, and examine the question of how
much state the client can send while still allowing the RPC chain to be faster
than the pair of RPC calls. We assume that the chaining function is already
cached at server 1, which is the common case for frequent chains.
Back-of-the-envelope calculation. We start with a simple calculation. Let
S be the size of the state sent by the client for the chaining function at server
1. Then, in terms of total latency, the RPC chain saves one network latency but
incurs S/link bandwidth to send the state. Thus, the RPC chain fares better as



















Figure 5.10: Execution time using an RPC chain versus standard RPC to
call 2 servers.
S < link latency × link bandwidth
For wide area links, the latency-bandwidth product can easily be in the tens
to hundreds of kilobytes or more.
Experiment. We executed the RPC chain and the pair of RPC’s. The client
was located in Redmond while the servers were in Mountain View. (Because
both servers were in the same site, this setup favors the RPC chain by an addi-
tional network latency; we later explain the case when the servers are far apart.)
Figure 5.10 shows the client end-to-end latency as a function of the state size
(error bars show standard error). For the standard RPC execution, state size
does not affect total latency, since this state simply stays at the client. The total
latency was 75±1 ms. For the RPC chain, the latency naturally increases with
the state size. The point at which both lines cross is at ≈150 KB. This is a fair
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of RPC copy and Chain copy under various set-
tings: clients collocated with servers in mountain view; client
in redmond; and client in Beijing.
amount of state to send in many cases—definitely much more than we needed
in either of our applications.
If servers 1 and 2 were far apart, this would shift the RPC chain line up by
the corresponding extra latency. For example, if the latency from server 1 to
server 2 were 15 ms, the lines would cross at ≈100 KB (assuming the distance
from client to server 2 remains the same), which is still a reasonable state size
(and much more than we needed in our applications).
5.4.3 Storage application
We now evaluate the use of RPC chains for the storage application described in
Section 5.3.1.
Copy performance. In our experiments, we copy data from one storage
server to another using two utilities: one that uses RPC chains, called Chain
copy, and another that uses standard RPC’s, called RPC copy. Both utilities use
pipelining, so that the client has multiple outstanding requests on either server.
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We also tried using the operating-system provided “copy” program, but it per-
formed much worse than either Chain copy or RPC copy, because it it reads and
writes one chunk of data at a time (no pipelining).
In our first experiment, a single client copies a file of variable size (25 KB,
100 KB, 250 KB, and 500 KB) between two servers, and we measure the time it
takes. We vary the location of the client (Mt. View, Redmond, Beijing) and fix
the location of the servers in Mt. View. In the setting where both the client and
the servers were in Mt. View, we placed them in two separate subnets, where
the ping latency between the two was 2 ms and TCP bandwidth was 10 MB/s.
Figure 5.11 shows the results. Each bar represents the median of 40 repeti-
tions of the experiment. As we can see, Chain copy provide considerable bene-
fits in every case, compared to RPC copy. The benefits are greater for larger files
and longer distances between client and servers. In a local setting, the copy-
ing time is reduced by up to factor of 2, while in the longest-distance setting
(Beijing-Mt. View), the reduction is up to a factor of 5.
Another benefit of using Chain copy (not shown) is a reduction by a factor
of two in (a) the aggregate network bandwidth consumption, and (b) the client
bandwidth consumption. This reduction is important because links connecting
data centers have limited bandwidth and/or are priced based on the bandwidth
used.
In our next experiment, we vary the number of clients simultaneously copy-
ing files from one server to another, and measure the resultant throughput and
latency of the system. This allows us to observe the behavior of the system
under varying load as well as measure the peak throughput of the system. As
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Figure 5.12: Throughput-latency of RPC copy and Chain copy.
before, the client machine was located in Redmond and the servers were located
in Mt. View. We ran multiple client instances in parallel on the client machine,
each client copying 1000 files in succession, each file measuring 256 KB in size.
We measure the time that each client takes to complete copying 1000 files, and
compute conservative throughput and latency numbers based on the slowest
client.
Figure 5.12 shows the results of the experiment. For both RPC copy and
Chain copy, the average latency decreases as the amount of workload placed
on the system increases. Initially, the increase in workload also results in an in-
crease in the aggregate throughput of the system, but once the system becomes
saturated, any increase in workload only increases latency without any gain in
throughput. Our results show that RPC copy is able to sustain a peak through-
put of 4.5 MB/s. This peak throughput occurs when the network link between
the client and the servers, which had a bandwidth of 6.3 MB/s, becomes sat-
urated. Since Chain copy does not require that the data blocks of the files be-
ing copied actually flow through the client, it was not subject to this limitation
and was thus able to achieve a higher peak throughput of 10.4 MB/s. Rather
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Figure 5.13: Benefit of chain composition.
than a network bandwidth limitation, Chain copy’s throughput is limited by
the servers’ ability to keep up with requests.
Benefit of chain composition. In this experiment, we measure the benefit of
composing RPC chains. We use two chains: one for copying from one server to
another (as above) and the other for primary-backup replication of the second
server (as in Figure 5.5). We compare two systems that use RPC chains; one
system uses chain composition to combine the two chains, while the other has
composition disabled. In the experiment, one client copies one file of variable
size from the non-replicated server to the replicated server. The client is in Cam-
bridge, the source server is in Mt. View, the primary of the destination server is
in Mt. View, and the backup of the destination server is in Redmond.
Figure 5.13 shows the result. As we can see, composing the chain reduces
the duration of the copy by 12%-20%, with larger files having a greater reduc-
tion. Without composition, the destination server has to handle both requests
from the source server as well as the replies from the backup server. Composi-
tion reduces the load on the destination server by allowing the backup server
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Figure 5.14: RPC chain in web mail application.
to send replies directly to the client. In addition, composition eliminates the un-
necessary messages from the backup server to the destination server, reducing
the amount of bandwidth consumption. A combination of these factors allow
composition to improve the overall performance of the system. As file size in-
creases, the setup cost becomes relatively small compared to the actual cost of
executing the chains. This makes the impact of the more efficient chain that
resulted from composition more apparent.
5.4.4 Web mail application
We now describe the evaluation of the web mail application presented in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. In our experimental setup, we placed the client in Mountain View,
the mail server and the authentication server in Redmond, and all other servers
in Beijing. This setup emulates the case where a user from Asia travels to the
US and wants to access web mail services that are hosted in Asia. Since the web
mail provider may have servers deployed worldwide, the user can be directed
to a mail server and an authentication server (Redmond) that is close to his cur-
rent location (Mountain View). However, user-specific data is stored on servers
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close to the user’s normal location (Beijing), so the mail server has to fetch data
from those machines.
Specifically, after receiving a cookie from the client and verifying the client’s
identity, the mail server must fetch the client’s email from the storage server
followed by appropriate ads from the ad server, both of which are located in
Beijing. A traditional system implemented using RPC’s would have the mail
server contact the storage server, fetch the user’s emails, then contact the ad
server to retrieve relevant ads. However, in our setting, where the mail server
is located close to the client but far away from the storage server and ad server,
traversing the long links between Redmond and Beijing four times would be
less than ideal. As described in Section 5.3.2, RPC chains allow us to elimi-
nate unnecessary network traversals. In this case, our RPC-chain-enabled mail
server sends emails directly from the storage server to the ad server before re-
turning the result to the mail server, halving the number of long link traversals.
We measure the client perceived latency of opening an inbox and retrieving
one email: the client first contacts the front end authentication server to authen-
ticate herself, then she sends a read request to the mail server to retrieve a single
email. We measure the time it takes for the client to receive the email, which is
appended with an ad whose size is small relative to the size of the email. We
vary the size of the email that is fetched, and for each size, we repeated the
experiment 20 times.
As shown in Figure 5.14, RPC chains consistently reduces the client per-
ceived latency of the web mail application. As the size of the email increases,
the latency improvement from using RPC changes also increases. Overall, we
found that the use of RPC chains reduced the latency of the web mail applica-
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tion by 40% to 58% when compared to standard RPC’s.
We note that the significant performance gains of using RPC chains comes
at a very low cost of implementation. For the web mail application, the effort
involved in enabling RPC chains was mainly in terms of implementing chaining
functions which totaled a mere 48 lines of C# code. In general, a simple way for
existing applications to benefit from RPC chains is to identify the critical causal
path of RPC requests, and replace that path with an RPC chain. The effort is
that of writing a single RPC chain; in the worst case, one can do it from scratch.
The harder problem is finding the critical causal path, which has been an active
area of research (e.g., [3]).
5.5 Limitations
Chaining state cannot always be sent. RPC chains are not appropriate if the
chaining state is large or if it cannot be determined when the client starts the
chain. For example, suppose that (1) A calls B using an RPC, (2) A gets a reply,
and (3) depending on the state of a sensor or some immediate measurement at
A, A then calls C or D. It is not possible to use an RPC chain A→B→(C or D),
because the choice of going to C versus D must be made at A where the sensor
is.
Programming with continuations. To use RPC chains, developers need
to make use of continuation-style programming. This can be much harder
than programming using sequential code, because continuations must explic-
itly keep track of all their state. Continuations are notoriously hard to debug,
because there is no simple way to track the execution that led to a given state.
115
We note, however, that programming with continuations is already toler-
ated in code that uses asynchronous RPC’s and callbacks. Moreover, one could
perhaps write a tool that automatically produces continuations from sequential
code, using techniques from the compiler literature (see, e.g., [5]).
Terminating chains. When an application terminates, it is usually desirable
to release its resources and halt all its activities. However, if the application
has outstanding RPC chains, it is not easy to terminate them. This problem
exists with traditional RPC’s as well (there is no easy way to terminate a remote
procedure), but it is worse with RPC chains because the remote servers involved
may not be known.
RPC chains are designed for relatively short-lived executions, and for these
uses, this problem is less of a concern, because a chain soon terminates anyways.
The only exception is a buggy chain that runs forever. For such chains, the
RPCC library can impose a maximum chain length, say 2000 hops, and throw




Distributed systems are here to stay. As more and more of the systems that
developers build become distributed, it is important to provide developers with
the tools to make it easy to build robust, high-performance distributed applica-
tions. In this thesis, we have looked at several different ways towards realizing
this goal.
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that while many well-known consensus pro-
tocols such as Paxos, Chandra-Toueg, and Ben-Or at first appear different, they
share an underlying commonality. We distilled this commonality into the form
of a single skeleton algorithm that can be instantiated into each of these specific
protocols by configuring the quorum systems that are used, the way instances
are started, and other protocol-specific details. Using this approach, we im-
plemented the skeleton algorithm and used it to instantiate Ben-Or, Chandra-
Toueg, and two variants of the Paxos algorithm. Simulation experiments using
our implementation allowed us to explore the effect of the differences between
these algorithms on their performance under different workloads and crash fail-
ures. We believe that the skeleton algorithm is an interesting basis for the un-
derstanding of consensus algorithms and comparison of their performance, and
provides a novel platform for the exploration of other possible consensus pro-
tocols.
We demonstrated that well-known consensus protocols such as Paxos,
Chandra-Toueg, and Ben-Or can be derived from a single skeleton. An interest-
ing feature of this skeleton is that it uses not one but two quorum systems. By
instantiating these quorum systems, as well as some other details of the skele-
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ton, specific consensus protocols can be derived. We have implemented this
skeleton and have used it as the basis for a performance comparison.
In Chapter 3, we examined a potential way to reduce the performance cost
of building Byzantine fault tolerant systems. While Byzantine fault tolerance
aims to provide resilience against arbitrary failures, in many applications, fail-
ures and contention are not the norm. Here, we have examined optimization
opportunities in contention-free and failure-free situations. We provided two
definitions of one-step asynchronous algorithms that provide low latency per-
formance in favorable conditions while guaranteeing strong consistency when
failures and contention occur. We proved lower bounds in the number of pro-
cessors required for such algorithms, and presented Bosco, an algorithm that
meets those bounds.
In Chapter 4, we generalize our approach and discuss one-step algorithms
in the context of k-set agreement. We presented an algorithm that solves this
problem for crash faults when n > f k − k2 + f + max(2k, f + 1) and showed that
this is optimal for the class of popularity-based protocols.
The number of processors that the algorithm requires is modest for small
values of k. For k = 1, the consensus problem, our algorithm requires 3 f + 1
processors, which matches the lower bound for one step agreement [13]. For
k = 2, the algorithm requires 4 f − 2 processors. It is also a modest requirement
for values of k near f , requiring 3 f + 1 and 4 f − 2 for k = f and k = f − 1
respectively. For intermediate values of k, the number of nodes required can be
quite large. For k = f /2, it requires f 2/4 + 2 f + 2 processors. So if there is room
for significant improvement on this problem, it would be in this range.
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One noteworthy feature of our algorithm is that it provides a very simple but
non-trivial way to turn a consensus algorithm into a k-set agreement algorithm.
Since implementing new distributed computing algorithms is generally time
consuming and error-prone, this allows an implementer to re-use an existing
implementation and, if contention is relatively rare, gain almost the full benefit
of a more general k-set agreement algorithm.
We have not proven a general lower bound for this problem, but Lemma 32
shows that any correct algorithm can be broken into a decision rule for what
value to decide if at most k values are received in the first round and an algo-
rithm for reaching a decision in the general case. Our algorithm uses a natural
decision rule: decide on the most popular value (using an ordering over val-
ues to break ties). Theorem 35 shows that our algorithm is optimal among al-
gorithms that use this decision rule. This implies that attempts to find better
algorithms must focus on alternative decision rules.
Obvious alternative decision rules we have examined do not seem promis-
ing. One option is to sometimes decide on a less popular value. However, this
requires a processor to decide on a value that, should other processors not learn
of its decision, has less support for them deciding on it. Another option is to
bias either towards or away from a processor’s local value (for example when
breaking ties). We have been unable to come up with an algorithm of this fla-
vor that performed well. As such, finding a true lower bound or an improved
algorithm remains an open problem.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we proposed the RPC chain, a simple but powerful
primitive that combines multiple RPC invocations into a chain, in order to op-
timize the communication pattern of applications that use many composite ser-
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vices, possibly developed independently of each other. With RPC chains, client
can save network hops, resulting in considerably smaller end-to-end latencies
in a geodistributed setting. Clients can also save bandwidth because they are
not forced to receive data they do not need. We demonstrated the efficacy of
RPC chains for a storage and a web application, and believe that RPC chains
can be applied in many other applications.
While our implementation of RPC chains proved effective in our sample ap-
plications, we believe that there are several useful extensions that can be built
into RPC chains. One possible extension is the support of intermediate chain
results. If a client wants to receive some results from intermediate servers of
the chain, these results need to be relayed through the chain. If the amount of
data is large, it can impose a significant overhead. We can extend RPC chains to
address this issue, by allowing each server in the chain to directly return some
data to the client.
Another useful extension to RPC chains is the support for large chaining
states. The chaining state is the state that the client sends along the chain to
execute the chaining functions. If this state is large, this can incur a significant
state overhead. Two optimizations are possible to mitigate this cost.
Fall-back to standard RPC. As explained in Section 5.2.7, we can execute
a chain in interactive mode, which causes the chain to go back to the client at
every step. This is effectively a fall-back to standard RPC, causing all chaining
functions to execute at the client, which eliminates the overhead of sending the
chaining state, at the cost of extra network delays. We explored this trade-off in
Section 5.4.2. It is possible to have the RPCC library gauge the size of the chain-
ing state before starting the chain, and if the state is larger than some threshold,
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execute the chain in interactive mode. The threshold can be chosen dynamically
based on previous executions of the same chain, in an adaptive manner. By do-
ing so, an RPC chain will always perform at least as well as standard RPC’s,
modulo the small computational overhead of executing chaining functions and
the time it takes to adapt.
Hiding latency. In our implementation, servers wait to receive the chaining
state before executing the next service function in the chain. This waiting is not
necessary, because the service function depends only on its parameters, not on
the chaining state (the chaining state is only needed for the chaining function,
which executes later). Therefore, a natural optimization is to start the service
function even as the chaining state is being received. If the service function
takes significant time to complete, (e.g., it involves disk I/O or some lengthy
computation), this will mask part or all of the latency of transmitting the chain-
ing state.
In conclusion, while much work remains to be done, we believe that our
contributions in this thesis moves us closer to the goal of providing developers




[1] Apache zookeeper. http://hadoop.apache.org/zookeeper/.
[2] Michael Abd-El-Malek, Gregory R. Ganger, Garth R. Goodson, Michael K.
Reiter, and Jay J. Wylie. Fault-scalable Byzantine fault-tolerant services.
SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 39(5):59–74, 2005.
[3] Marcos K. Aguilera, Jeffrey C. Mogul, Janet Wiener, Patrick Reynolds, and
Athicha Muthitacharoen. Performance debugging for distributed systems
of black boxes. In ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages
74–89, October 2003.
[4] Amazon.com, Inc. Amazon simple storage service: Copy proposal. http:
//doc.s3.amazonaws.com/proposals/copy.html.
[5] Andrew W. Appel. Compiling with Continuations. Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
[6] Yariv Aridor and Mitsuru Oshima. Infrastructure for mobile agents: Re-
quirements and design. InWorkshop onMobile Agents, pages 38–49, Septem-
ber 1998.
[7] D. Barbara´, S. Mehrotra, andM. Rusinkiewicz. INCAs: Managing dynamic
workflows in distributed environments. Journal of Database Management,
Special Issues on Multidatabases, 7(1):5–15, Winter 1996.
[8] M. Barborak and M. Malek. The consensus problem in fault-tolerant com-
puting. ACM Computing Surveys, 25(2), 1993.
[9] M. Ben-Or. Another advantage of free choice: Completely asynchronous
agreement protocols. In Proc. of the 2nd ACM Symp. on Principles of Dis-
tributed Computing, pages 27–30, Montreal, Quebec, August 1983. ACM
SIGOPS-SIGACT.
[10] Martin Biely, Josef Widder, Bernadette Charron-Bost, Antoine Gaillard,
Martin Hutle, and Andre´ Schiper. Tolerating corrupted communication.
In PODC ’07: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Prin-
ciples of Distributed Computing, pages 244–253, New York, NY, 2007. ACM.
[11] Romain Boichat, Partha Dutta, Svend Frolund, and Rachid Guerraoui. Re-
constructing Paxos. ACM SIGACT News, 34, 2003.
122
[12] Elizabeth Borowsky and Eli Gafni. Generalized flp impossibility result for
t-resilient asynchronous computations. In Proc. of the 25th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 91–100, San Diego, California,
1993.
[13] Francisco V. Brasileiro, Fabı´ola Greve, AchourMoste´faoui, andMichel Ray-
nal. Consensus in one communication step. In Proc. of the 6th Interna-
tional Conference on Parallel Computing Technologies, pages 42–50, London,
UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[14] Mike Burrows. The chubby lock service for loosely-coupled distributed
systems. In OSDI ’06: Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating sys-
tems design and implementation, pages 335–350, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006.
USENIX Association.
[15] M. Castro and B. Liskov. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. In Proc. of
the 3rd Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI),
New Orleans, LA, February 1999.
[16] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical byzantine fault tolerance.
pages 173–186, 1999.
[17] T.D. Chandra and S. Toueg. Unreliable failure detectors for reliable dis-
tributed systems. J. ACM, 43(2):225–267, 1996.
[18] Tushar D. Chandra, Robert Griesemer, and Joshua Redstone. Paxos made
live: an engineering perspective. In PODC ’07: Proceedings of the twenty-
sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages
398–407, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[19] Bernadette Charron-Bost and Andre´ Schiper. The Heard-Of model: Uni-
fying all benign failures. Technical Report LSR-REPORT-2006-004, EPFL,
June 2006.
[20] Soma Chaudhuri. Agreement is harder than consensus: Set consensus
problems in totally asynchronous systems. In Proc. of 9th Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 311–324, Quebec City,
Quebec, Canada, 1990.
[21] Soma Chaudhuri. More choices allowmore faults: Set consensus problems
in totally asynchronous systems. Information and Computation, 105:132–158,
1993.
123
[22] James Cowling, Daniel Myers, Barbara Liskov, Rodrigo Rodrigues, and Li-
uba Shrira. HQ replication: a hybrid quorum protocol for Byzantine fault
tolerance. In OSDI ’06: Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating Sys-
tems Design and Implementation, pages 177–190, Berkeley, CA, 2006. USENIX
Association.
[23] Jeffrey Dean and Sanjay Ghemawat. MapReduce: Simplified data process-
ing on large clusters. In ACM Symposium on Operating System Design and
Implementation, pages 137–150, December 2004.
[24] Dan Dobre and Neeraj Suri. One-step consensus with zero-degradation. In
DSN ’06: Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks, pages 137–146, Washington, DC, 2006. IEEE Computer Society.
[25] M.J. Fischer, N.A. Lynch, and M.S. Patterson. Impossibility of distributed
consensus with one faulty process. J. ACM, 32(2):374–382, April 1985.
[26] Michael J. Freedman, Karthik Lakshminarayanan, Sean Rhea, and Ion Sto-
ica. Non-transitive connectivity and DHTs. In Conference on Real, Large
Distributed Systems, pages 55–60, December 2005.
[27] Roy Friedman, Achour Mostefaoui, and Michel Raynal. Simple and ef-
ficient oracle-based consensus protocols for asynchronous Byzantine sys-
tems. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 02(1):46–56,
2005.
[28] Robert Gray, David Kotz, Saurab Nog, Daniela Rus, and George Cybenko.
Mobile agents: The next generation in distributed computing. InAizu Inter-
national Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures Synthesis, pages
8–24, March 1997.
[29] Rachid Guerraoui, Nikola Knezevic, Vivien Quema, and Marko Vukolic.
The Next 700 BFT Protocols. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM European confer-
ence on Computer systems, 2010.
[30] Rachid Guerraoui and Michel Raynal. The information structure of indul-
gent consensus. In Proc. of 23rd IEEE International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, 2003.
[31] Rachid Guerraoui and Michel Raynel. The alpha of indulgent consensus.
The Computer Journal, 2006.
124
[32] Colin G. Harrison, David M. Chess, and Aaron Kershenbaum. Mobile
Agents: Are they a good idea? In International Workshop on Mobile Object
Systems, pages 25–47, July 1996.
[33] Naohiro Hayashibara, Pe´ter Urba´n, Andre´ Schiper, and Takuya Katayama.
Performance comparison between the Paxos and Chandra-Toueg consen-
sus algorithms. In Proc. of International Arab Conference on Information Tech-
nology, pages 526–533, Doha, Qatar, December 2002.
[34] James Hendricks, Gregory R. Ganger, and Michael K. Reiter. Low-
overhead Byzantine fault-tolerant storage. In Proc. of twenty-first ACM
SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages 73–86, NewYork,
NY, 2007. ACM.
[35] Maurice Herlihy andNir Shavit. The asynchronous computability theorem
for t-resilient tasks. In Proc. of the 25th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 111–120, San Diego, California, 1993.
[36] M. Hurfin, A. Moste´faoui, and M. Raynal. A versatile family of consen-
sus protocols based on chandra-toueg’s unreliable failure detectors. IEEE
Trans. Comput., 51(4):395–408, 2002.
[37] Larry Huston, Rahul Sukthankar, Rajiv Wickremesinghe, M. Satya-
narayanan, Gregory R. Ganger, Erik Riedel, and Anastassia Ailamaki. Di-
amond: A Storage Architecture for Early Discard in Interactive Search.
In USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies, pages 73–86, March
2004.
[38] Suresh Jagannathan. Continuation-based transformations for coordination
languages. Theoretical Computer Science, 240(1):117–146, June 2000.
[39] Idit Keidar and Sergio Rajsbaum. On the cost of fault-tolerant consensus
when there are no faults. SIGACT News, 32(2):45–63, 2001.
[40] Jonathan Kirsch and Yair Amir. Paxos for system builders: an overview. In
LADIS ’08: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Large-Scale Distributed Systems
and Middleware, pages 1–6, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[41] Ramakrishna Kotla, Lorenzo Alvisi, Mike Dahlin, Allen Clement, and Ed-
mund Wong. Zyzzyva: speculative Byzantine fault tolerance. In Proc. of
twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages
45–58, New York, NY, 2007. ACM.
125
[42] L. Lamport. The part-time parliament. Trans. on Computer Systems,
16(2):133–169, 1998.
[43] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine generals problem.
Trans. on Programming Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401, July 1982.
[44] Leslie Lamport. Lower bounds for asynchronous consensus. Technical
Report MSR-TR-2004-72, Microsoft Research, July 2004.
[45] Leslie Lamport. Fast Paxos. Distributed Computing, 19(2):79–103, 2006.
[46] Harry C. Li, Allen Clement, Amitanand S. Aiyer, and Lorenzo Alvisi. The
paxos register. In SRDS ’07: Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Sympo-
sium on Reliable Distributed Systems, pages 114–126, Washington, DC, USA,
2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[47] D. Malkhi and M.K. Reiter. Byzantine Quorum Systems. Distributed Com-
puting, 11:203–213, June 1998.
[48] Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K. Reiter, Avishai Wool, and Rebecca N. Wright.
Probabilistic quorum systems. Information and Computation, 170(2):184–206,
2001.
[49] J-P. Martin and L. Alvisi. Fast Byzantine consensus. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, pages 402–411,
June 2005.
[50] Jean-Philippe Martin and Lorenzo Alvisi. Fast byzantine consensus. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 3:202–215, 2006.
[51] Michael G. Merideth and Michael K. Reiter. Probabilistic opaque quorum
systems. In Andrzej Pelc, editor, DISC, volume 4731 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 403–419. Springer, 2007.
[52] Zarko Milosevic, Martin Hutle, and Andr Schiper. Unifying Byzantine
Consensus Algorithms with Weak Interactive Consistency. In Proceed-
ings of the 13th International Conference On Principles Of Distributed Systems
(OPODIS), 2009.
[53] Luc Moreau. The PCKS-machine: An abstract machine for sound eval-
uation of parallel functional programs with first-class continuations. In
European Symposium on Programming, pages 424–438, April 1994.
126
[54] Achour Moste´faoui, Sergio Rajsbaum, and Michel Raynal. Conditions on
input vectors for consensus solvability in asynchronous distributed sys-
tems. J. ACM, 50(6):922–954, 2003.
[55] Achour Moste´faoui, Sergio Rajsbaum, Michel Raynal, and Corentin
Travers. The combined power of conditions and information on failures
to solve asynchronous set agreement. SIAM J. Comput., 38(4):1574–1601,
2008.
[56] Achour Moste´faoui and Michel Raynal. Solving consensus using chandra-
toueg’s unreliable failure detectors: A general quorum-based approach.
In Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Distributed Computing,
pages 49–63, London, UK, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
[57] Achour Moste´faoui andMichel Raynal. Solving consensus using Chandra-
Toueg’s unreliable failure detectors: A general quorum-based approach. In
Proc. of the International Symposium on Distributed Computing, pages 49–63,
1999.
[58] Achour Mostefaoui and Michel Raynal. Randomized k-set agreement. In
Proc. of 13th Annual ACMSymposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures,
pages 291–297, Crete Island, Greece, 2001.
[59] M. Naor and A. Wool. The load, capacity, and availability of quorum sys-
tems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 27(2):423–447, April 1998.
[60] Jakob Nielsen. Designing Web Usability: The Practice of Simplicity. New
Riders Publishing, Indianapolis, 1999.
[61] M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport. Reaching agreement in the presence
of faults. J. ACM, 27(2):228–234, April 1980.
[62] Sylvia Ratnasamy, Paul Francis, Mark Handley, RichardM. Karp, and Scott
Shenker. A scalable content-addressable network. In Conference on Applica-
tions, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication,
pages 161–172, August 2001.
[63] Antony Rowstron and Peter Druschel. Pastry: Scalable, decentralized ob-
ject location, and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. In Interna-
tional Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms, pages 329–350, November
2001.
127
[64] F.B. Schneider. Implementing fault-tolerant services using the state ma-
chine approach: A tutorial. ACM Computing Surveys, 22(4):299–319, De-
cember 1990.
[65] Yee Jiun Song, Marcos K. Aguilera, Ramakrishna Kotla, and DahliaMalkhi.
Rpc chains: efficient client-server communication in geodistributed sys-
tems. In NSDI’09: Proceedings of the 6th USENIX symposium on Networked
systems design and implementation, pages 277–290, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2009.
USENIX Association.
[66] Yee Jiun Song and Robbert van Renesse. Bosco: One-step byzantine asyn-
chronous consensus. In DISC, pages 438–450, 2008.
[67] Yee Jiun Song, Robbert van Renesse, Fred B. Schneider, and Danny Dolev.
The building blocks of consensus. In ICDCN, pages 54–72, 2008.
[68] Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Hari Bal-
akrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet ap-
plications. In Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Pro-
tocols for Computer Communication, pages 149–160, August 2001.
[69] Christopher Strachey and Christopher P. Wadsworth. Continuations: A
mathematical semantics for handling full jumps. Higher-Order and Symbolic
Computation, 13(1-2):135–152, April 2000.
[70] David L. Tennenhouse, Jonathan M. Smith, W. David Sincoskie, David J.
Wetherall, and Gary J. Minden. A survey of active network research. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 35(1):80–86, January 1997.
[71] Pe´ter Urba´n and Andre´ Schiper. Comparing distributed consensus algo-
rithms. In Proc. of International Conference on Applied Simulation and Mod-
elling, pages 474–480, 2004.
[72] Jim White. Telescript technology: The foundation for the electronic mar-
ketplace, 1994. Unpublished manuscript. White paper, General Magic, Inc.
[73] Jim White. Mobile agents white paper, 1996. Unpublished manuscript.
Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?
doi=10.1.1.55.7931.
[74] World Wide Web Consortium. SOAP version 1.2. http://www.w3.org.
128
[75] Weihai Yu and Jie Yang. Continuation-passing enactment of distributed
recoverable workflows. In ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pages
475–481, March 2007.
[76] Yuan Yu, Michael Isard, Dennis Fetterly, Mihai Budiu, U´lfar Erlingsson,
Pradeep Kumar Gunda, and Jon Currey. DryadLINQ: A system for
general-purpose distributed data-parallel computing using a high-level
language. In ACM Symposium on Operating System Design and Implemen-
tation, pages 1–14, December 2008.
[77] Ben Y. Zhao, Ling Huang, Jeremy Stribling, Sean C. Rhea, Anthony D.
Joseph, and John D. Kubiatowicz. Tapestry: A resilient global-scale overlay
for service deployment. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
22(1):41–53, January 2004.
[78] Piotr Zielinski. Optimistically terminating consensus: All asynchronous
consensus protocols in one framework. In ISPDC ’06: Proceedings of the
Proceedings of The Fifth International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed
Computing, pages 24–33, Washington, DC, USA, 2006. IEEE Computer So-
ciety.
[79] Piotr Zielinski. Automatic verification and discovery of byzantine consen-
sus protocols. In DSN ’07: Proceedings of the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP Inter-
national Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, pages 72–81, Wash-
ington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
129
